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ABSTRACT
As we continue to learn and grow in an ever evolving technological age, we deepen our
understanding of the importance of authentication. There are many different types of
authentication, each exhibiting their own strengths and weaknesses. Each authentication
mechanism serves the same purpose: to verify a user’s identity. In this thesis, we explore
two authentication mechanisms aimed at helping users remember stronger authentica-
tion tokens: one aimed at creating a secure, memorable token, and the other aimed at
strengthening a previous token (known as a password strengthening technique). The first
is GeoPassNotes, a geographic location-based authentication scheme. GeoPassNotes
requires users to select a location on a digital map and then annotate it in order to authen-
ticate. The combination of the location and the annotation is the authentication token.
GeoPassNotes allows users to select a location that is tied to a significant event / memory,
which is very memorable to that person. The other system we design and explore is
PassMod, a system designed to help users create more secure versions of their password.
This system separates itself from other password strengthening techniques because it
interprets and attempts to preserve the original meaning behind the user’s password. We
demonstrate that it is possible to create a more secure password without compromising
the memorability of the original password. Both GeoPassNotes and PassMod help users
produce a more secure, yet memorable authentication token.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Despite many weaknesses, passwords remain the most common form of authentication.
Passwords authenticate legitimate users to access assets. At one point in time, passwords
were well suited to this task. However, everything is online now: photos, banking
information, life stories, etc. We are becoming a “cloud-centric” civilization, and are
still relying on old habits to protect our identities. Passwords still remain the best option,
despite the apparent weaknesses with their use in authentication [33]. A lot of research
has been done on the memorability and security of passwords, but there is not enough
evidence against them to stop using them. Therefore, they remain the best option.
Now that most of our resources are accessed and authenticated through the web, many
security risks are present that were not previously possible. A dedicated hacker can try to
crack passwords from the comfort of his own home. Much research has been done on
leaked password datasets (RockYou, Yahoo) which has led to many insights about how
users choose passwords. Users tend to reuse passwords wherever possible, and when a
different password is required (as the result of an updated password policy) users will
only slightly modify their password to meet the policy (e.g., add a number to the end of
their existing password) [35]. Users choose passwords in predictable ways due to the
constraints of their memorability; attackers know this, and use this to their advantage.
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The results are not pleasant; passwords are vulnerable and easily guessed [33, 36, 59].
This motivated us to help users create a more memorable authentication token, one that is
more difficult for an attacker to crack yet still very memorable to the user.
1.1 Motivation
As the tools of the attacker continue to grow, security administrators compensate by
enforcing more stricter password composition policies. Many password policies now have
length requirements, special character requirements, letter, number, and case requirements.
It has come to a point that in order for a password to be considered “secure”, it must
be a random, non-pronounceable sequence of letters, characters and numbers. This
increases the burden on the memorability of the average user. Users cannot be expected
to remember unique, 12 character random passwords for every account.
The increased burden of having to remember multiple passwords leads to dangerous
coping strategies for users. To name a few, people will write down their passwords, store
all of their passwords in one file, and reuse their passwords for multiple accounts. Some
password policies enforce a password change at set intervals (e.g., 3 months). This is
a major nuisance for most users, but it is required for security purposes. Something as
simple as this makes it more difficult, albeit not impossible, for a determined hacker to
crack a password within the time constraints of the expiration policy. However, changing
the password to the same thing with the addition of a number or letter does not increase
the security [67]. This, among other slight modifications, is a common coping strategy
for users dealing with the issue of having to remember multiple passwords.
One potential solution to this problem is the use of a Password Manager, such as
LastPass [38]. Password managers are a central repository for the storage of account
credentials. It allows users to store their passwords, removing the need to remember
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them. Typically, password managers are secured by a strong password, but it is much
easier for a user to remember one password as opposed to a unique one for all of their
accounts. To some, this seems like a secure, memorable way to store and access account
credentials. To others, however, it is a single point of failure for all of a user’s accounts.
If an attacker can crack the password securing the password manager, they will have all
account information for the accounts in it.
The systems presented in this thesis are aimed at decreasing the burden of memorabil-
ity on users while increasing security. We help users create a more secure and memorable
authentication token, such that it is not as difficult for them to remember a single, secure
password for use in e.g., a password manager. The systems presented still take advantage
of the deployability and ease-of-use of passwords, but yield greater memorability and
security.
1.2 Thesis Summary
Our research focuses on helping users successfully authenticate to their accounts using a
secure, unique, memorable authentication token. We do this by establishing a relationship
between the users’ memories and their passwords. In one approach, instead of having
a user create a non-memorable, random sequence of characters, we get them to select
a location on a digital map of the Earth and then annotate that location with a word or
sequence of words they can associate with the location they chose. We call this system
GeoPassNotes (which is an extension of the GeoPass system from Thorpe et al. [56]).
The main intuition behind GeoPassNotes is that significant events and experiences are
extremely memorable [65] and users also have a stronger memory for pictures and images
over words and strings [43]. GeoPassNotes first requires users to think of a location that
is easy for them to remember but difficult for others to guess as in GeoPass, then it asks
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users to create an associated annotation. We conducted a 30 person multi-session user
study that spanned the course of 2 weeks. Our goal was to see whether an annotated
location-password (location plus annotation) was more memorable, as memorable, or
less memorable than traditional text-based passwords. The results indicate that annotated
location-passwords are an extremely memorable way for users to authenticate, even when
being asked to recall their annotated location-password one week after creation. The
results of our study indicate that the majority of places the users chose were locations
they had been, or would like to visit, and one that not many others would know about
(similar to GeoPass [56]). These locations and events were memorable to them, and
easy for them to authenticate with, but not easy for an attacker to discover without
knowing anything about the target user. Most users reported the system was very easy
to use, some indicating it was a “fun” or “cool” way to authenticate. When compared
with GeoPass, GeoPassNotes were similarly more memorable since no user forgot their
annotated location-password (compared with 2 forgotten location-passwords in GeoPass
[56]). We propose that GeoPassNotes is most suitable for environments where logins are
infrequent or as secondary authentication. This is mainly due to the longer login times
(~25-35 seconds) when compared with traditional passwords (under 10 seconds) [4].
While annotated locations proved to be a highly memorable way to authenticate, login
times are high, limiting their use in every day situations. We were also interested in
improving the memorability of traditional passwords, ones that could be entered quickly
and used for frequently accessed accounts. Users apply a particular thought-process
before first creating a password [11]. Whether the password is related to a memory,
a significant other, a historic / memorable date, etc., users make decisions about what
components and themes to add to their passwords. We conjecture that these decisions
are most likely based on what the users deem memorable and the perceived security for
the account they are creating the password for. For example, a user creating a password
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for a financial institution may be more inclined to add more components (security) to the
password to make it more secure [19]. In any case, the password the user ends up with is
assumed to be memorable to them. Veras et al. explored a large variety of user-chosen
passwords with the goal of determining how users choose passwords [59]. If we assume
a password chosen by a user is memorable to that user, maybe we can make it more
secure while preserving the memorabilia contained in the original password. Previous
attempts at strengthening passwords contained many issues [27] which PassMod fixes.
For example, if the attacker was able to gain access to the strengthening algorithm or the
database used for strengthening, a significant amount of strengthened passwords could
be cracked. Furthermore, since edits were made at the character level, in order for the
resulting password to be memorable, a maximum of 1-2 edits could be performed [27].
The system we developed differs by taking a users password and adding / modifying
components to make it more secure, all while keeping its original semantic components
intact so that it makes sense to the user. The reason it makes sense to the user is because
our strengthening algorithm operates by adding / modifying at the word level, not the
character level. If it makes sense to the user, the user will be able to remember it.
One of the reasons secure text passwords are not memorable is because they are not
presented in a way that is easy for the user to remember. For example, the password
“<=Clt?zO1Y:96d]}Y8M” is very secure, but few users can remember it as they can’t
break it up into memorable components. That is, each character has to be remembered
individually as opposed to remembering whole words. However, our system is capable of
taking a password the user originally thought was memorable, such as “iloveschool1999”
and inserting a semantically sensible component such that the resulting password is
“iloveschoolmemories1999”. The memorability of the original password remains intact,
but a new component has been added to enhance the user’s password by making it more
secure. Another example is the password “barkingdog5”. When entered into our system,
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a resulting password suggestion was “quitbarkingdog5”. As demonstrated by these two
examples, this system makes semantically sensible insertions that follow the English
language, and hopefully makes them more memorable than random insertions.
We conducted a 43 person user study to test the usability and memorability of
passwords strengthened by PassMod. The study was comprised of 3 sessions spanning
the course of 8-9 days. Users were required to login with their suggested passwords
and complete the questionnaires where appropriate. The results indicate that users had
similar memorability for their new passwords in practice. The login rate was very high for
each session, and only 6 people had to reset their password throughout the course of the
study. When compared to traditional text passwords, the median login times were similar.
Some users even left comments at the end of the study stating that the system “helped
them think of a password they wouldn’t have otherwise thought of” or “the suggested
password was long but surprisingly memorable”. We propose that PassMod is well-suited
for everyday environments where logins are frequent (e.g., a password mamnager) and
possibly also when users have multiple sites they must use a strong password for.
1.3 Thesis Statement
This thesis explores the possibility that password security can be improved through
the use of systems and strategies that are more compatible with human memory. Such
compatibility is important as it may reduce the use of insecure password coping strategies
[35].
The following questions will be answered through this research:
1. Is it possible to increase the security of location-passwords by annotating them in a
way that preserves the memorability of their unannotated counterparts?
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2. Is it possible to automatically increase the security of a user’s text password in a
meaningful way such that the resulting password remains memorable?
3. What is the difference in terms of usability versus security of GeoPassNotes and
PassMod? Also, how does this compare to passwords with a standard 8-character
password policy in place?
1.4 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows: (1) We propose two novel user authentication schemes
called GeoPassNotes and PassMod. (2) We design, implement, and pilot test these systems
to refine their interfaces. (3) We measure their usability through two separate user studies.
(4) We estimate the security of the systems using the user study data collected. (5) We
perform an in-depth comparison between these two systems and compare with traditional
passwords and policies where appropriate.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes literature relating
to GeoPassNotes in the field of geographic authentication schemes and graphical hybrid
schemes. We also describe work relating to PassMod such as passwords in general,
password modification systems, and attacks against passwords. Chapter 3 describes the
GeoPassNotes system including the interface design, user study conducted, usability
analysis, security analysis, and discussion of interesting results. Chapter 4 details the
PassMod system including the interface design, usability and security analyses, and
discussion of results. In Chapter 5 we compare the GeoPassNotes and PassMod systems
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to each other and to traditional passwords. Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize our




It has been known for years that traditional passwords have flaws. Many researchers
have researched ways to make passwords more secure, ways to make passwords more
memorable, and alternative authentication methods to traditional passwords. Our research
focuses on password memorability, including alternative authentication schemes that
boast high memorability, and ways to create more secure, yet memorable passwords.
This chapter first explores previous research into an alternative authentication mecha-
nism known as graphical passwords. More specifically, we explore geographic authenti-
cation schemes as they relate most closely to GeoPassNotes. Authentication through a
digital map can be seen as a type of graphical password. GeoPassNotes is a system that
contains both a graphical and textual element. As such, we also review graphical-text
hybrid schemes. While graphical password schemes might be more memorable, we are
also interested in their drawbacks. We investigate some state-of-the-art attacks against
graphical password schemes. We also explore graphical-text hybrid schemes as GeoPass-
Notes combines the location with an annotation (see Section 2.2). Next, we explore
traditional password approaches. More specifically, we look into previous research on
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password strengthening techniques and automatic strengthening of passwords. We focus
on the flaws with this research and the weaknesses demonstrated by previous literature
(see Section 2.3).
2.2 A Survey of Graphical Passwords
For over 14 years, various graphical password schemes have been proposed as viable
alternatives to text-based passwords [17, 29, 61, 64]. Graphical passwords were created
with the intention of fixing the weaknesses that plague regular text passwords. It is well
known that password authentication is becoming less secure as the tools of an adversary
grow [33]. Computers are now able to perform millions of computations per second.
This is made possible as more processors and memory can inexpensively fit onto a single
motherboard [42]. The end result is a computer that an adversary can use to crack
passwords at high speeds. As a direct result of an attacker’s ability to crack passwords
with ease, many system administrators enforce password composition policies that are
unrealistic and frustrating for the average user. Inglesant and Sasse [28] explored the
burden complex password policies have on users. One password policy enforced 7 or 8
characters, must contain three classes of characters (classes being uppercase, lowercase,
digits, special), must not contain any words or proper names. One user’s remark about the
system was “so it’s got to the point where it’s ... so difficult to make one up, and difficult
to remember, that I have to write it down.”. This results in unsafe coping strategies by
the user, such as password reuse over multiple accounts, minimally unique password
changes, or writing down passwords [50]. This issue represents the classic usability-
security trade-off. The average users want a more usable system, mainly because they
are unaware of the dangers of weak passwords, or what constitutes a password as being
weak. The system administrators that are aware of this problem err on the side of security.
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Unfortunately, despite these weaknesses in text-based passwords, they are still the most
prominently used authentication mechanism for virtually every account.
Graphical passwords aim to remedy this situation. A graphical password can be
defined as an authentication mechanism that utilizes a graphical user interface [29].
Contrary to what one would think, not all graphical passwords utilize a background image
(the user performing an action on a picture). Some involve the user simply doodling
on a blank grid. Graphical passwords were created with usability and memorability in
mind, to directly benefit the end user. Many graphical password approaches also contain
a relatively large theoretical password space, making them viable alternatives to the
problems that text passwords contain. A complete overview of graphical passwords is
out of the scope of this thesis; see a survey [8] for a comprehensive overview. Instead, we
focus on geographic authentication schemes, which can be viewed as a subset of graphical
passwords that involve a digital map as a background image. Geographic authentication
is a form of a cued-recall graphical password scheme. Cued-recall systems involve the
user remembering specific locations on an image. During password creation, the user
will have to select a predetermined number of points and remember them for future login
attempts [61].
2.2.1 Geographic Authentication Schemes
Geographic authentication schemes require users to select a location on a digital map to
authenticate with. GeoPassNotes takes advantage of what’s known as “event-specific”
memory [35]. It has been shown that users have greater memorability for pictures
over words, and geographic schemes extend this one step further by exploiting event
memory, or memory of significant moments in life or history. Users are able to remember
significant moments in life (e.g., where they got engaged, first date, historic war site, etc.)
and use this as an authentication token [11]. This is not a heavy burden for the user to
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remember as it is something they have already committed to memorize. After this point
we change our focus from geographic authentication schemes in general to more specific
examples and implementations of geographic authentication schemes.
Spitzer et al. [52] presented a cued-recall scheme that uses the user-friendly nature of
Google Maps to authenticate users. Users are presented with a map of the United States
with an overlaid grid on top. The user is asked to enter his / her username and select
whether they want to zoom in 5 or 7 levels. The user then clicks on a grid square on the
map. When they click, they are zoomed into that grid square and shown a blown up area
of that square. A new 16x16 grid is then overlaid and they must select another square.
They are zoomed in again and must repeat this process for the number of zooms they
selected. Spitzer et al. tested the usability of their system in a 50 person user study. In
total, each level contained 256 possible grid locations that the user could select. Users
were tasked with remembering the grid square they selected at each zoom level. Usability
ratings at the end of the study indicated that it was a lengthy process, longer than typing
in a normal password.
Sun et al. [55] present PassMap: a map based graphical password scheme. PassMap
allows users to login using a series of 2 points chosen on a digital Google Maps interface.
Users have the ability to zoom in to any zoom level they choose to set their passwords.
There are two phases to PassMap, registration and login. During registration, the user
navigates the map and selects his / her two locations. The user is required to confirm the
two chosen points. For the login phase, the user is asked to input the same two points they
chose. In total, there were 27 university students that participated in the user study. The
usability results were very high for PassMap (login accuracy of 92.59% after one week
and 81.13% after six weeks), indicating that it is a good alternative to text passwords.
Thorpe et al. [56] presented GeoPass which uses the graphical interface of Google
Maps to authenticate users. Users must zoom in to zoom level 16 before setting their
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Fig. 2.1 A snapshot of interface of the GeoPass scheme [56].
location-passwords to increase the variability over the limited 5 or 7 levels as in Spitzer
et al. [52]. The authors conducted a multi-session in-lab / at-home user study to test the
usability and memorability of GeoPass. 35 university students were recruited to take
part in the user study. The study was broken into 3 sessions that spanned the course
of 8-9 days. The study demonstrated very high memorability for location-passwords.
Users self-perceived memorability and failed login attempts per session support that the
system was highly memorable. This was seen as 97% of users were able to remember
their location-password over the span of 8-9 days. The median login times for sessions 1,
2, and 3 were 25s, 30s, and 25s respectively. While login times were high, most users
indicated they would use this method every day, or at least if they knew it was more secure
than text passwords. Some users even commented and mentioned that they prefer the
increase in security and don’t mind the long times. The security of location-passwords is
also comparable to text passwords. The maximum security for the system is 37 bits, and
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for the weakest 11% it was estimated to be 16.75, which would still be enough security
to hold up to an online guessing attack [20].
Al-Ameen et al. [2, 3] recently ran a 66-day long field study [2] with GeoPass, finding
a 96.1% login success rate and that 100% of participants logged in successfully within five
attempts on average. They also conducted two separate three week long studies [3] to test
the interference of multiple location passwords (4 per user) for both the GeoPass scheme
and GeoPass with modified instructions. The modified instructions were to ask users
to make a meaningful association between their location password and corresponding
account. Their results indicate that in the absence of mental associations, GeoPass suffers
from interference effects of multiple location passwords; however, by leveraging mental
associations, the login success rates were 98% after one week.
GeoPass appears as the most user friendly geographic authentication scheme and
has extremely positive memorability and usability results. The main motivation for the
addition of notes to location passwords is to increase security. GeoPassNotes has at least
the security of GeoPass since in an online attack, the attacker needs to first guess the
location and then the associated note. As such, we chose to use this as the base of our
research in creating GeoPassNotes (see Chapter 3).
Graphical-text Hybrid
As GeoPassNotes can also be seen as a hybrid graphical-text scheme, we review related
literature on such hybrids below.
Marasim [32] is a graphical-text hybrid authentication scheme. During enrollment,
the user creates tags for a personal image of their choice. Using the tags created, four
random images are found on Google. The four random tag-related images are then mixed
with 4 decoy images and the user is asked to correctly identify the four images related to
their tags.
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GridWord [7] is a hybrid scheme as well. During enrollment, the user selects a set of
three words. The system stores a one-to-one mapping of words to cells on a 2D grid. The
user can then enter their password by selecting the three grid cells or selecting the three
words from drop-down menus.
Inkblot authentication [54] is another hybrid scheme that is based on cueing users
with a set of inkblot images. During enrollment, the user is asked to create a tag for each
inkblot, and then type the first and last letters of the tag. For example, a set of 10 inkblot
cues produces a 20-character password.
These hybrid schemes, like GeoPassNotes, involve a graphical and associated text
element. To the best of our knowledge, GeoPassNotes is the first hybrid system that uses
digital maps for text-location associations.
2.2.2 Attacks on Geographic Authentication Systems
As with any authentication scheme, whether it be passwords, graphical passwords, bio-
metrics, etc., active enthusiasts will always try to “crack” the authentication mechanisms.
Since they are the most prominently used authentication scheme to date, passwords have
been the central target of attacks for years. More on password authentication can be found
in section 2.3. Van Oorschot and Thorpe [58] investigate the notion of “hotspotting” in
cued-recall graphical password schemes. Hotspotting refers to areas of the image that
users attention is naturally drawn to (e.g., points, areas with contrasting colours, etc.) and
as such, they are more likely to select a point there. They then developed an algorithm
that can crack a significantly large number of cued-recall graphical passwords using
the notion of hotspotting. While this has not been applied to geographic authentication
schemes, this concept is still relevant as a certain amount of hotspotting can be seen in
the results presented in GeoPass [56].
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Shoulder surfing is an inherent weakness with most graphical authentication schemes.
Shoulder surfing is the act of an adversary observing password creation or login. By
observing the user as they enter their password, an adversary can observe some or all of
the users password [16]. Alphanumeric passwords have some resistance to this weakness
as their ASCII characters are typically hidden (stars or dots) as the user types in their
password.
2.3 A Survey of Passwords
Traditional alphanumeric passwords have been the most widely used authentication for
over 50 years [66]. We use passwords every day from logging into Facebook to see what
our friends are doing to making a credit card payment online through our banking website.
We have relied on this form of authentication for years, despite growing concerns.
2.3.1 Password Attacks
Over the years, passwords have been one of the primary subjects of research due to the
increasing numbers of authentication-related attacks [25, 34, 53]. Financial concerns are
a major motivator as well as privacy concerns. The goal of passwords is to authenticate
a legitimate user to a resource. However, if non-legitimate users are able to obtain
authentication credentials of a user, they can successfully authenticate as that user.
John the Ripper
For a while, the most popular password cracking tool was John the Ripper (JtR) [45]. JtR
took a password file containing hashes and attempted to crack the hashes using a variety
of guessing attacks. The primary operation of JtR is dictionary mode which uses a list of
common passwords to try and guess weak passwords in the password file. This method
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works well if the passwords JtR is trying to crack are very weak (i.e., contained in the
list). Another mode of JtR is referred to as “incremental mode”. In incremental mode,
JtR tries to crack passwords without an input dictionary. It does this by using frequency
tables and trying the most frequent characters first. It will also try variations of these
passwords. While this mode may crack some passwords that were not in the dictionary, it
is much slower than the dictionary mode.
Probabilistic Context-free Grammars
Over the years, more sophisticated attacks against passwords have taken place. Traditional,
dictionary style attacks are no longer the state-of-the-art method for cracking passwords.
Now, cracking a password that has never been seen before is more likely. But how can a
password that has never been seen before possibly be guessed by a deterministic machine
such as a computer?
Weir et al. [63] develop a system called Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFG)
that generates guesses in the highest probability order. The goal is to generate guesses in
decreasing probability order in order to try and crack the most probable passwords first.
Password collections needed to be divided up into two sets, the training set and the test
set.
When parsing a training set, simple structures and base structures are created. A
simple structure is just a description of the password (SLD where S = special string, L
= alpha string and D = digit string). The base structures are the same but have lengths
of each of the strings as well. The first pre-processing technique is to derive all of the
base structures and their associated probabilities from the training set. A pre-terminal
structure is a base structure that has values substituted for S and D. The pre-terminals
define mangling rules that can be directly applied in cracking trials. Given a pre-terminal
structure, a dictionary is used to derive a terminal structure. In an example where an alpha
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word of length 3 was needed, a dictionary word of length 3 is required to make a guess.
Thus, a comprehensive input dictionary is required. Pre-terminals have an associated
probability, so one approach is to fill in all words for a specific, highly probably pre-
terminal, then move on to the next one, etc.
Three dictionaries were used to test PCFG on: MySpace, SilentWhisper and the
Finnish list. In order to train the PCFG and generate the grammars, half of each dataset
was taken and used for training (except SilentWhisper as this set was very small). Pass-
words not in the training set were used as a target. Popular password cracker John the
Ripper [44] and PCFG require an input dictionary to operate, thus, six publicly available
dictionaries were used. The first test was against the MySpace passwords. 3 trials were
conducted: John the Ripper with default mangling rules (leetifying words, prepending /
appending characters, case substitutions) applied, PCFG with pre-terminal probabilities
applied, and PCFG using the probabilities of the terminals (guesses). PCFG with terminal
probabilities was the most effective cracker. Another trial was conducted to see the effect
that the training dictionary size has on the effectiveness of PCFG. The results show that
the larger the set, the more effective PCFG is as a password cracker. At the time of it’s
inception, PCFG-based password cracking was the very best, able to crack significantly
more passwords than JohnTheRipper. The reason for this is the abstraction to the structure
form of passwords, rather than the password itself.
Semantic Cracker
Veras et al. [59] present the first framework for segmentation, semantic classification and
semantic generalization of passwords. By segmenting a password into its components,
Veras et al. were able to analyze the semantic structure contained in the password; the
essence of the password. Using natural language processing techniques, Veras et al. were
able to generate guesses used to crack passwords. This framework was able to crack
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significantly more passwords than the previous best method (67% more passwords from
LinkedIn and 32% more passwords from MySpace). This method was also reported to be
the best at cracking English language passwords when compared with 11 other popular
password crackers [30].
Veras et al. make use of a variety of English corpora consisting of source corpora
(collection of raw word lists, used as base for building the segmentation candidates)
and reference corpora (a collection of part-of-speech tagged N-grams with frequency of
use information, used for selection the most probable segmentation). The main corpus
used was the Contemporary Corpus of American English (COCA), as this is a very large,
general-purpose corpus containing part-of-speech tagged unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams
as well as the observed frequencies in the English language. This is used as the reference
corpus, and a trimmed version is used as part of the source corpus. The trimmed version
removes words with three characters that have a frequency of less than 100, only used the
top 37 two character words and only used ‘a’ and ‘I’ for single letter words. The reason
for the trimmed corpus is to reduce the occurrence of short, rare words in an effort to
speed up parsing and improve accuracy. COCA is a very useful general-purpose corpus,
but it is not useful for names entities. Thus, a names list, cities list, surnames list, months
list, and countries list were also used.
Veras et al. assume that every password is a combination of words and/or gap seg-
ments. A word is a string found in a corpus whereas a gap can be a number, space, symbol,
etc. Using this method, segmentation’s of the password can be created. Segmentation’s
are ranked based on coverage (the presence of gaps) and frequency of use. The frequency
of use is determined by the reference corpora, since this contains ranked n-grams which
can be used to rank segmentation’s based on likelihood. The next step was to use the
segmentation method discussed above to extract words from the RockYou passwords.
Veras et al. report that a limitation of their segmentation algorithm is that it is limited
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to English passwords. This is due to the fact that English corpora were used to train the
system.
Part-of-speech tagging is required for the semantic classification of nouns and verbs.
POS tagging works better when context is provided, however there are many free tools
that provide reasonable part-of-speech tagging results. The algorithms used was the
POS tagging module of the NLTK. The results indicate that the POS tagger does a
good job at tagging given the context. For example, for the passwords gangsterlove and
ilovestacy, the tagger was able to distinguish between the word love being a noun and
verb, respectively. The algorithm takes a string of passwords and outputs for each an array
K = [s, t,c] where s is the string, t is the POS tag, and c is the semantic category. First,
WordNet was used to classify strings. Only nouns and verbs were assigned a semantic
category. If s is a gap, it is classified using regular expressions. If it is a proper noun, the
source corpora is used to tag it as a month, female name, male name, surname, country,
or city. The ability to generalize semantic categories is desirable. Thus, Li and Abe’s [39]
tree cut model is used to select the best generalization for the sample. Some of the most
popular semantic categories are names and dates (unsurprisingly), but more interesting
ones are love, places, sexual terms, royalty, profanity, animals, food, alcohol, and money.
The intuition behind the usefulness of semantic patterns is that some words tend to be
paired up with specific classes of words. For example, the verb eat is typically followed
by the name of a food. This is significant in terms of security because only semantically
probable guesses will be made first which will result in a large reduction of the guess
space. The guess generator was modeled after PCFG. PCFG works well when the training
set is the same as the target set. Veras et al. used their semantic generator to output
guesses in the highest probability order and input them directly into JtR for cracking.
When semantic guesser was trained on RockYou, approximately 67% more passwords
from LinkedIn were cracked. 32% more passwords were cracked when using MySpace.
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Since this is the most effective password cracking algorithm to date, we decided to use the
same semantic PCFG to inform the PassMod system. The PassMod system was designed
with the same algorithm as presented by Veras et al. [59].
Since this was known as the best attack, other researchers looked into the opposite
side of things. If PCFG’s can be used to crack passwords with positive results, could they
be used to create a better password to begin with?
2.3.2 Password Modification Systems
Abadi et al. [1] attempted strengthening passwords as early as 1997. They state that a
password P that is supplied by a user could be strengthened using a password supplement
Q which is provided by the system. Traditional authentication uses a password P and
a salt S which is fed through a collision-free hashing function H as demonstrated by
the function H = f (P+S). Abadi et al.’s strengthening system can be demonstrated by
the function H = f (P+Q). They state the difference between a salt and a password
supplement is storage of a salt on the system where the user is authenticating. For
example, typically, hashes are stored with a plaintext salt to provide randomness to the
output hashes. The password supplement seen in Abadi et al.’s system is not stored on
the system. The password supplemnt is randomly generated on password creation, and
then discarded. When a user attempts to login with their password, the system tries to
regenerate the password supplement. This is essentially a brute-force method until it
gets the right one. Once it gets the right one, the user is granted access. In every case,
after the password supplement is used, it is discarded, never being stored on the system.
The system stores all possibilities of the password supplement Q and essentially tries to
bruteforce the correct one every time the user tries to logon. The benefit of this approach
is the password supplement is not stored on the system, but is computed when the user
enters their password. Since the password supplement is generated by the system at
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the time the password is input, this means that if an attacker were to gain a copy of the
password database for use in an offline attack, they would be unable to regenerate the
password supplement.
Forget et al. [21, 22] demonstrate a method of strengthening passwords by randomly
inserting randomly chosen characters at random intervals in the users password. The
user then has the option to “shuffle” the inserted characters and to be presented with a
password that has newly inserted characters. The user has the option to shuffle as many
times as they like. Forget et al. conducted a user study to test the memorability and
security of the suggested passwords. The results indicate that the theoretical security of
passwords was able to be improved significantly. However, multiple insertions into a users
already strong password resulted in them starting with a weaker password. This lowered
the overall security of the system, as users intentionally selected a weaker password due
to the memory constraints.
Houshmand et al. present an approach that analyzes and modifies users passwords
at the time of creation if they are considered weak. Weak passwords are determined
based on the probability of the password being cracked using a probabilistic context-free
grammars approach as seen by Weir et al. [63]. If the password is determined to be weak,
the password is slightly modified to be stronger while still preserving the structure of
the original password so that it is still memorable to the user. Passwords are determined
weak if they fall below a certain threshold value. The threshold is calculated as a function
that takes into account hash type and system cracking speed. Based on a system with
a 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo using MD5 hashing, the authors selected 2.96×10−13 as a
threshold. With this threshold, it can be guaranteed an attacker using this machine would
take 1 day to crack the password. The system works by taking the users’ password, and
converting it to a base structure. The base structure of a password is the tagged segments
of the password all put together to make one long structure. The base structure should
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have a probability associated with it from training. The probability is then compared
with the threshold value to see if the password is weak or not. One main goal of this
system is that when a weak password is modified, it must still remain as memorable as the
original password. The authors make the same assumption as in our research; the original
password the users typed is a memorable password to that user. Operations that can be
done to modify the base structure are insertion, deletion, and transposition. Operations
that can be done to the components of the password are insertion, deletion, substitution,
and case changes.
Houshmand et al. use three stages in the process of strengthening passwords:
Step 1 Used to generate all passwords at or below a certain threshold. This stage is a
password cracking algorithm that outputs passwords in highest probability order.
This algorithm takes a password’s grammar structure, and sends it as input to step
2 to generate the guesses.
Step 2 A guess generator for a particular structure. This step searches for valid terminals
to fill the components of the structure. The most probable terminals are tried first.
The output is a list of passwords that were created from the input structure. If this
step was called from step 1, this list will be used in a cracking attack.
Step 3 This is the actual strengthening algorithm. The input to this step is a list of
passwords (from step 2). This step references a strengthening database, which is
a collection of password structures, Markov chains, and dictionaries, each with
associated probabilities. Passwords can either be fully processed or partially
processed into the database. When passwords are fully processed into the database,
the Markov chains probabilities are updated and the dictionaries are updated. When
partial processing is being used, the Markov chain probabilities are updated but the
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dictionaries are not; this becomes relevant later when we discuss attacks against
PCFG-based strengthening systems.
In order to test Houshmand et al.’s system, three separate password sets were used:
RockYou (32 million plaintext passwords), MySpace (61,000 passwords), and
Hotmail (9,000 plaintext passwords). For each of these sets, half of the passwords
were taken and used for training the PCFG. The system takes either one password
or a set of passwords at a time. It checks the probabilities of the passwords against
the threshold value. If the password is determined to be weak, it is modified. A
password is determined weak if it could be cracked in one day. After all of the
passwords were strengthened, the authors ran two password cracking algorithms
to try to guess the newly formed passwords. John the Ripper and PCFG were
both used. The passwords were grouped into one of four categories: originally
strong, originally weak - not able to make stronger, originally weak - able to make
stronger, and strengthened passwords. The results indicate that passwords that were
originally strong and strengthened passwords were very resistant to cracking. JtR
cracked 1% of these passwords and PCFG cracked 5%.
2.3.3 Weaknesses of Password Modification Systems
The methods described in Section 2.3.2 are a step in the right direction. However,
after a more thorough analysis of the modifications made and how they were
made, other researchers were able to conclude that in previously proposed methods,
automatic strengthening of passwords may be less than optimal, and make more
issues than it fixes.
When passwords are automatically strengthened using probabilistic techniques
such as by Houshmand et al. [27], specifically with an edit distance of 1, it is
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possible that the strengthened passwords are susceptible to an attack [47]. Schmidt
et al. describe an edit distance of 1 single character as one modification (insertion,
deletion, replace) that is performed on the original password. The equivalent of
this in the semantic system would be one modification of an existing component
or insertion of a new component. We note this method of attack as it is the only
known comparable attack against PassMod. The authors make the assumption that
the strengthening algorithm is known through repetitive use. There are two attacks
an attacker can mount against strengthening schemes that do modifications as in
our system and others (e.g., [21, 22, 27]):
1. The attacker could build a library of passwords that are statistically similar
to the strengthened passwords. This means that if the training data used to
create this library is similar to the guesses made in the original system, the
output would be able to guess a significant number of passwords. This could
then be used in a PCFG attack.
2. The second approach involves the attacker employing a guided brute-force
attack against the original, weak password, and then trying all known strength-
ening variants.
In general, a way to prevent (1) above is to have the system be adaptive in terms of
password suggestions. With regards to modification systems, if the users’ password
is not strong enough, one or more modifications are made to it until it achieves
a high enough score. When passwords are modified, the initial password, and
any strengthened variants, are added to whatever database the scoring algorithm
requires for its use. This will keep the scoring algorithm adaptive, and take into
account strengthened passwords as well.
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With regards to Houshmand et al.’s system described in Section 2.3.2, passwords
are inserted into the database in order to make the process adaptive. By having a
collection of strengthened and unstrengthened passwords, the system can ensure
that once the occurrence of a certain structure becomes too high, it can be assigned
a lower probability and not suggested as modification. For example, over time, one
type of structure may start out as being strong, but get suggested so many times
that it becomes weak. This is the “adaptive” part of the system. This step takes the
password and applies a modification to it based on the number of modifications
allowed (edit distance of 1 or 2).
Resistance to PCFG-Based Attacks
Houshmand et al.’s [27] algorithm 3 ensures that every password output meets the required
threshold at the time of creation. However, due to the algorithm’s adaptive nature, when
processed with a different dataset at a later point in time, the guess probability will vary.
Therefore, it’s possible that at the time, a password is secure, but when using a different
dataset to measure strength, the password could be weak (e.g., strengthen with RockYou,
try to crack with LinkedIn).
Houshmand et al. [27] found that using the original passwords to try to crack the
strengthened passwords produced by algorithm 3, the attack is very ineffective (1.3% in
a day, 2.2% in a week). However, when using the strengthened passwords produced by
algorithm 3 to train the algorithm, the attack (within one edit) is more effective, cracking
2.5% in a day and 4.6% in a week. When passwords are strengthened with an edit
distance of 2 edits, the strengthening algorithm works well, resulting in only 1.3% of the
passwords being cracked in one week, even when using algorithm 3.
Due to the nature of algorithm 3, only the strengthened passwords are partially pro-
cessed into the database (the Markov chains probabilities are updated, but the dictionaries
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are not). If the full strengthening database is leaked (fully processed original and strength-
ened passwords), attacks against strengthened passwords are much better. Three types of
attacks are performed by Schmidt et al. [47] against Houshmand et al.’s system:
Attack 1 - PCFG-based attack where the strengthening database is leaked (partially
processed original and strengthened passwords). This would be the effect of the
database after algorithm 3 has been run (since in algorithm 3, each password and
suggestion is partially processed).
Attack 2 - Step 3 where all original and modified passwords are fully processed. Every
string, and structure in both passwords enters the dictionaries. Furthermore, Markov
Chains are updated.
Attack 3 - Step 3 where all original passwords are fully processed (every string, structure
enters dictionaries, Markov Chain probabilities are updated) and all modified
passwords are partially processed (only Markov Chain probabilities are updated).
Attack 1 as presented provides no information to an attacker. This is attributable to
the partial processing of both the original and strengthened passwords in the database
(i.e., only the Markov chain probabilities are updated). Attack 2 with fully processed
original and strengthened passwords (i.e., Markov chain probabilities are updated and the
dictionaries are updated) provided the most information to the attacker. However, within
10−15 guess probability (PCFG probability of the structure multiplied by the probabilities
of all terminals), 75.6% of passwords could be cracked with an edit distance of 1. For
an edit distance of 2, this number is reduced to 50%. Attack 3 saw 28.7% of passwords
guessed within 10−15 guess probability (GP) for an edit distance of 1, and 10.3% for an
edit distance of 2. All three attacks perform similarly in a PCFG cracking attack when
the resulting databases are used as input to PCFG (~18% after 10−15 GP).
2.3 A Survey of Passwords 28
Resistance to Guided Brute-force Attacks
In this attack scenario, Algorithm 1 is used to generate passwords below a certain GP,
and a brute force attack is used against the original, unstrengthened passwords. Once
guessed, PCFG’s can be used to quickly discover all possible variations of passwords. It
was also shown that this attack was quite successful, with the only limiting factor being
the time taken to compute guesses.
One possible way to thwart a GBF attack is to increase edits. However, as shown in
previous work [47], going beyond two random edits significantly impairs memorability.
Another possibility is to enforce that the original password is stronger. Requiring that
the original passwords’ GP to be at most 10−12 completely thwarted the GBF attack all
together [47].
2.3.4 User Choice In Passwords
Up to this point, all attacks reported in the literature on PCFG grammars were based on
the PCFG algorithm of Weir et al. [63]. When a user creates a password, they do not
do so randomly. There are though processes and memories that play into the creation of
every password. We explore user choice in passwords to better understand the thought
processes and procedure of selecting a password. If we can better understand how a
user selects a password, perhaps we can find a way to help them create a more secure
password that makes sense to them. As such, in order to truly make an effective cracking
algorithm, the meaning of passwords must be taken into account.
Veras et al. [60] develop a way to explore passwords graphically through the use of a
visualization. They hypothesize that semantic patterns exist in passwords, but are difficult
to classify computationally. Thus, they create a visualization that allows a user to explore
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a dataset and discover semantic patterns. Veras et al. are primarily interested in dates and
numbers in passwords. The RockYou dataset was used as the basis for this experiment.
Since dates are the primary concern, the everyday use of dates is important. For
example, certain characters are generally used to delimit elements of a date (year, month,
day). Similarly, the format of a date varies from person to person (e.g., MM/DD or
DD/MM). In the RockYou dataset (32 million passwords) 25% contained sequences of 4
or more digits. Of these sequences, 62% contained 5 to 8 digits. Of all passwords that
contain numerical components, 37% contained date-like number sequences.
The visualization contains multiple views that contain different information. The
radial plot shows the distribution of dates parsed from passwords along with years and
decades. The radial plot represents years via circles, positioned in a radial layout. All
years of a certain decade are distributed throughout the ring, in a clockwise order. The
rings, which represent decades, are organized in ascending order from the center. The
frequency of patterns can be observed via the colour intensity. The Tile map depicts the
distribution of passwords across days and months. The colour code is consistent with that
of the radial plot; the darker regions are the most prominent. Clicking on a specific day
will update the word cloud to contain passwords associated with that specific day. The raw
passwords are shown in the word cloud view. The word cloud represents raw passwords
of different sizes according to their frequency. The word cloud is interactive in that a
researcher can click and remove prominent passwords, updating the graph to discover
new patterns that were previously unknown. The radial plot indicates that recent years
(after 1969) were the most popular. It was noted that of all of the dates, 86% were after
1969. Some possible reasons are that these dates represent birthdays, significant events,
and dates that the account was created. Using the word cloud, it was seen that single
characters and initials are the most popular text strings that co-occur with dates. When
full words are used, they are almost always months of the year with the date. Another
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interesting finding was that familiar dates were prominent, such as Valentines Day, New
Years Day, New Years Eve, and Christmas Day. Other days that were interesting are the
first day of spring, Indonesian Independence Day, and the day the Titanic sank.
Dates are just one form of semantic structure contained in a password. Using a
dictionary composed of only dates, approximately 22% of the date based passwords could
be guessed using a dictionary of only 15% of the total possible dates. If all possible dates
were able to be guessed (a dictionary size of 206,658), 4.16% of the RockYou passwords
could be guessed. This is an extremely effective attack considering the initial dictionary
is only comprised of dates.
2.3.5 Other Approaches to Improve Password Security
Password policies are aimed at guiding a user to create a more secure password by
enforcing a set of requirements the user must abide by to create their password. Password
policies can be relaxed, only enforcing a minimum character length (e.g., minimum 5
characters in length) or be very complex consisting of special character, length, case,
and digit requirements. The complexity of the password policy is up to the individual
organization implementing it. Good practice would have us seeing high value websites
(such as banking, government, etc.) employing stricter password composition policies
and less important sites having weaker ones. There has been much criticism in the area
of password composition policies in the past. For example, Weir et al. [62] found that
most password policies do very little in preventing online attacks. The reason for this
is users take the “path of least resistance” when creating a password. Users already
know what password they want to use, most likely due to password reuse. They may try
that password on a site, only to be informed that their password is not “secure” enough
because it does not meet the complexity requirements of that website. Therefore, the
user appends the missing character to the end of the password, and they now can use that
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password. An example of this can be seen by a user that uses the password “password”
for every site. One site they come across requires digits in their password, so they append
a 1 to the end of their password to make “password1” which satisfies the password policy.
Attackers know this behaviour exhibited by users and can leverage it in an online attack
[62].
Egelman et al. [18] investigate the influence that password meters have on password
creation and password changes. The authors conducted a field study to test the effects
password meters of different types and orientations have on important and unimportant
accounts. Their results indicated that passwords created with a meter present yielded
no statistical difference in terms of password length, strength, entropy distributions, and
login success rate. They were also able to conclude that browser features to remember
user passwords were not a factor in their experiment. The results of their study indicated
that password meters did not impact password creation in a statistically significant way,
and that in some cases they were unnoticed. Through a post questionnaire, they found
that 63.8% of the users in their study reused their passwords, and 22% of them reverted
to using their old passwords when the study was completed. They also mention that the
entire reason behind password meters in the first place is to “nudge” users into creating
a more secure password. However, from their study and research, it was found that
“Weakness was not a problem of which they were unaware, but one of which they were




It is well known that traditional text passwords have flaws. Weak passwords are easy to
crack, so many security administrators compensate for this by enforcing stricter policies.
This usually results in passwords that are difficult for users to remember without the use
of additional coping strategies (e.g., password managers, writing down passwords, or
password reuse [19]). This motivates new authentication approaches for accounts that
have infrequent logins as they are more likely to be forgotten and fallback authentication
methods in the event the primary authentication method is forgotten.
Location-password schemes, where a user chooses a specific place on a map instead
of a word, appear to have high memorability and provide sufficient security against online
attacks [56]. If an authentication scheme produces credentials that are highly memorable,
it is possible for users to remember more than one token, which may reduce their need
to reuse password [35]. As most users appear to choose places based on events that
occurred in familiar places, we hypothesize that it may be possible to incorporate other
event-related information with the location-password. Event-specific information, such
as the “what” and “who” of events (which tend to be recalled along with the “where”
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[35]), could be expressed in the form of an annotation (i.e., a word or sequence of words).
Therefore, we aim to enhance the security of location-passwords by asking users to choose
an annotation that can associate with their chosen location; we call this combination of
the location-password and its annotation an annotated location-password.
We implement an annotated location-password system called “GeoPassNotes”, which
is based upon the GeoPass location-password system [56]. We evaluate the security and
usability of GeoPassNotes through a user study involving 30 participants over 8-9 days to
allow comparison to unannotated location-passwords. The results of our study indicate
that annotated location-passwords are more secure and as memorable as unannotated
location-passwords (all participants recalled their annotated location-password after one
week). Many users seemed interested to login to their accounts using this scheme and
were curious if it would ever be used in practice. Other users indicated that it was a fun,
secure take on traditional password authentication. Given that the median login times are
33 and 36 seconds for sessions 2 and 3 respectively, we suggest the most appropriate use
for GeoPassNotes is accounts where logins are infrequent (e.g., once per week). It is also
useful for fallback authentication (e.g., in place of personal knowledge questions) [46].
This work has been published as a part of a journal paper [40].
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the inter-
face components of our GeoPassNotes system. Section 3.3 details our study methodology
and procedure. Section 3.4 contains two main sections: a security analysis (see Section
3.4.1) and a usability analysis (see Section 3.4.2). In Section 3.5, we explain resulting
policy recommendations. In Section 3.6, we discuss interesting findings, and finally, in
Section 3.7, we conclude and discuss potential avenues for future work.
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3.2 System Design
Our GeoPassNotes system is the first to combine notes (a word or sequence of words the
user can associate with the location) with user chosen locations. The combination of the
location and the note is what makes the credential. GeoPass [56] was chosen as the basis
for the system as it is the least complex (the user only needs to remember one location, as
opposed to a sequence of locations or more than one location) and is thus most conducive
to eliciting event-specific memories. We implement the same functionality as GeoPass
for searching locations, zooming in, and panning the map. Users choose their location by
right-clicking on the map, which places an ‘X’ marker on the map for visual feedback.
One improvement over the GeoPass scheme that could be implemented is the use of
a locally hosted Google Maps API. Locally hosting Google Maps provides a number
of benefits including shorter load times, offline support, and not having search traffic /
geographic coordinates being sent in plaintext through the public Internet [24].
Users register by first selecting a location on the map as in GeoPass and then they
create an annotation. For a login to be successful, both the same location (error tolerance
accepted within a 10 pixel radius at zoom level 16 are tolerated) and the exact same
annotation must be re-entered. There are a few design differences from GeoPass based
on the introduction of the annotation:
• Annotation pop-up Once the user sets their ‘X’ marker, a pop-up box appears that
allows them to enter their annotation (see Figure 3.1). After typing the annotation,
the user can press the “Enter” key or “Login” button to login. This field is like a
regular password field in that the typed characters appear as circles and the user
can press the delete key as needed.
• Clickable ‘X’ marker To enable users to change the location entered before
logging in, they can close the annotation popup and then move the ‘X’ marker by
3.3 User Study 35
right-clicking elsewhere on the map. If they chose to keep the chosen location
after closing the annotation pop-up, they could re-open the annotation pop-up by
left-clicking on the ‘X’ marker.
Fig. 3.1 Snapshot of the GeoPassNotes interface.
3.3 User Study
We evaluated the usability and security of the system through a 30-person user study
that was approved by our university’s Research Ethics Board. The system was first
pilot tested with 3 experienced and 4 casual computer users, allowing us to iron out any
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obvious design flaws before the user study began. To enable comparison with unannotated
location-passwords, we use the same study design as for GeoPass [56].
3.3.1 Sessions
The study had three sessions over 8-9 days:
Session 1 (day 1, in-lab). Participants were shown a demo video that explained how
to create an annotated location-password and the various interface features. Users
were recommended to avoid directly labelling their location with the name of the
location itself (e.g., if the location was in Daytona Beach, avoid choosing labels
along the lines of “daytona beach” or “beach”). They were also recommended to
avoid choosing a location that they had lived or worked (as in GeoPass [56]). Of
course, in a field implementation, these recommendations should be enforced as
discussed in Section 3.5. Participants then practiced creating and confirming an
annotated location-password. After successfully confirming a practice annotated
location-password, users were asked to create and confirm the annotated location-
password that they will use for the remainder of the study. Some participants
asked if they were allowed to reuse their practice annotated location-password
as their main GeoPassNote. In this case, participants were told that they were
allowed to reuse their practice annotated location-password. Participants were then
distracted with a background questionnaire for approximately 10-15 minutes. To
conclude the session, participants were asked to login with their chosen annotated
location-password.
Session 2 (day 2, online). Session 2 was 24-48 hours after successful completion of
session 1. Participants were asked to login once to our online system. All 30
participants completed session 2.
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Session 3 (day 8-9, in-lab). Session 3 was held approximately one week after session
2. Participants were asked to login and complete a feedback questionnaire. All 30
users returned to complete session 3.
3.3.2 Environment
The in-lab sessions were conducted in an isolated environment at our university, in a room
dedicated to running user studies. Participants were asked to bring their own personal
laptops to complete the sessions. One user at a time completed the in-lab sessions to
allow the investigators to qualitatively observe how the user interacted with the system.
3.3.3 Participants
30 participants were recruited from a university campus through an email sent to all
students and also through posters. Participants were given $10 to participate in the study
and were also entered into a draw for $50.
A background questionnaire was used to gather demographic information. For all
questions, users were given the option to not answer. Our participants (19 male, 11
female) were all university students between the ages of 18 and 30. Most (28/30) were
between the ages of 18 and 25.
3.3.4 Limitations and Ecological Validity
As two sessions were performed in the lab (for qualitative observation), we only collected
data from 30 users. If our data set were much larger, it is possible that further patterns
in notes and locations than what we describe in the following sections could appear.
Web-based studies have advantages including the ability to gather larger sample sizes;
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however, they do not allow observing participants to collect qualitative data. Given that
this is the first study of GeoPassNotes, a larger study would be premature at this time.
Since we recruited our users from a university campus, our population is not fully
representative of who the users of this system might be. However, we only recruited
participants that had self-declared that they were not in IT programs, and had never taken
a course in security before. Despite this criteria, they most likely still had a heightened
awareness of computers and are probably more skilled than the average user, which might
positively impact e.g., our findings for login times.
3.4 Results
Here we discuss the usability and security results of our study. In Section 3.4.1 we analyze
the security offered by the notes alone and in combination with the location component.
In Section 3.4.2 we discuss usability results, which we found to be comparable to
unannotated location-passwords.
3.4.1 Security Analysis
The main reason for the addition of notes to location-passwords is to increase the security.
Thus, we aim to estimate the increased security as a result of adding notes. We do this by
(1) categorizing the notes collected from our study to observe their relationship to the
location, (2) estimating the security of the location component alone, (3) analyzing the
potential security impact of notes by categorizing them to determine common patterns
in user choice, (4) running popular password cracking programs against the notes to
estimate the security they alone provide, and (5) comparing the estimated security of
GeoPassNotes to that of regular passwords. Our analysis primarily focuses on resistance
to offline attacks, as that is a common threat model (distinct from shoulder surfing as
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discussed in Section 3.4.1). Offline attacks refer to an adversary who tries to guess a local
copy of hashed passwords.
Notes-Location Relationship
We first analyze the notes for any relationships with the corresponding locations chosen.
Through the use of a questionnaire, we asked participants why they chose their notes.
Out of our 30 users, 24 users claimed their notes held significance to the location. Two
users’ reasons for choosing their note were difficult for us to classify, and to say whether
they were related to the location or not, and four users’ notes descriptions indicated they
did not seem to be related to the location at all.
High estimate Low estimate
(per tripadvisor [57])
Guessing attack model attacker # locations attacker # locations
guesses guessed guesses guessed
Unknown adversary
(all land surface area) 236.88 30/30 (100%) 224.07 4/30 (13.33%)
Known adversary
(places lived and visited) 229.17 17/30 (56.67%) 219.69 3/30 (10%)
Local adversary
(Greater Toronto Area) 222.52 7/30 (23.33%) 216.75 2/30 (7%)
Table 3.1 Security estimates of the location portion of GeoPassNotes, based on guessing
attacks under different threat models, including that of a known adversary that knows
where the target lives and has vacationed.
However, it is interesting to note that even though the users saw a relationship, it
was difficult in most cases for us to determine. We manually analyzed each location and
note pair; the only relationship we could find was in 2 of the user’s notes where they
directly labelled their location. Direct location labels arguably provide the worst case
for note security. When a user labels a location, and the location is compromised, the
note can easily be guessed by compiling a small dictionary of location-specific terms.
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One user created his/her annotated location-password prior to the recommendation. The
other user was labelling a school. In this case, if an attacker discovers the location part of
the password (the school), some of the first location-specific words might be “school”,
“highschool”, “education”, etc. In this case, the note was “highschool”, and was placed
nearby the school. When we noticed the first user of our study labelling the location, we
decided to implement the “no labelling” recommendation for future users. In Section 3.5,
we discuss how proactive checking by the system can be used to prevent direct labels.
Location Security Estimates
Working towards our goal of estimating the security of GeoPassNotes, we must estimate
the security offered by the location component. For the location component of each
annotated location-password, we consider the same adversary models as used by GeoPass
[56]: local, known, and unknown. In the local adversary model, the adversary knows
the system’s deployed location (i.e., a specific building) and guesses its surrounding
area (i.e., a single city’s metropolitan area). If the location the user chose was in the
same geographic region as our deployed system, it was considered “guessed” under the
local adversary model. In the known adversary model, the adversary knows where the
target lives and has vacationed, and in the unknown adversary model, the adversary does
not have any information. The known adversary model success was estimated based
on the users’ responses to a question in the background questionnaire asking what the
significance of their chosen location was. If their answer indicated that they had been
there before, we categorized the location as “known”. High estimates are based on all
possible pixel locations on land being guessed (accounting for the system’s 21x21 error
tolerance), and low estimates are based on well-known points of interest (POI) found
on TripAdvisor [57]. We note that there is overlap between these adversary models.
For example, all of the low estimates are subsets of the corresponding high estimates
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(e.g., “Low estimate” local is a subset of “High estimate” local). Then for each estimate,
Local ⊂ Known ⊂Unknown.
We categorize each of the locations that users chose as part of their annotated location-
password in Table 3.1. The number of attacker guesses presented in Table 3.1 represent
the estimated number of guesses an attacker would need to successfully guess a location
that falls under each threat model [56].
To measure the actual security of the location component of annotated location-
passwords, we must determine whether there exist patterns in user choice that might
allow an adversary (unknown to the user, or someone who the user may know) to guess
the user’s secret location. We first plot the locations that our participants selected to
determine geographic patterns (see Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 indicates that the distribution
of locations chosen is fairly well spread-out. No two users chose the same location. In
general, the more populated areas of the Northern Hemisphere appear to be more popular.
The most popular area was Southern Ontario. In the questionnaire, we asked participants
to characterize the locations they chose by selecting what best described it. The results
indicate that 29/30 users from our user study followed our recommendation of avoiding a
place they lived or worked, and the most popular category was a place the participants
had visited or wanted to visit. Many users also stated the location was one they didn’t
think anyone else but them would know about.
To further categorize the location component of the participant’s annotated location-
passwords, we asked them whether the place had any personal memory or attachment;
43% (13/30) reported yes. This indicates a large amount did not report any significance
for the location they chose. Further free-form comments indicated that for most of these
users, their location password was a place they have been before, but not a place they
have been very often.
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Fig. 3.2 Heat map of the locations chosen for GeoPassNotes.
Note Categorization
We noticed that a few notes appeared to be names, and a significant number were simple
words. Surprisingly, a fairly large number looked like a password (containing mixed case,
numbers, special characters, etc.). Based on our informal observations, we categorized
the notes in terms of whether they exist in one of the following dictionaries:
• COCA (all). This dictionary should capture most words in the English language.
We use the Contemporary Corpus of American English (COCA) [14], which
contains 497,186 words.
• COCA (frequent). This dictionary should capture what we expect to be the most
common words, i.e., the most common nouns, adjectives, and verbs in COCA [14].
As a vocabulary of 15,851 words was found to cover 97.8% of the Brown Corpus
[48], we consider this as a likely vocabulary size. We sort the COCA unigram
database and find the frequency of the 15,851st word is 15,41. We only use the
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nouns, adjectives, and verbs that have frequency higher than 1,541, which produces
a dictionary of 14,674 words.
• Names. The dictionary contains common names, based on a list of babies born in
the USA since 1960 [51]. There are 82,386 unique names in this list.
• Location-specific terms. The adversary could use custom information about the
specific location chosen to guess the note. For example, if the location was a
golf course, then one might assume that the name of the golf course (or some
variation of it) could be chosen. To estimate the dictionary size, we consider the
worst-case scenario for a street intersection: the user chooses the two street names,
in both orders, with no spaces in between, and with all possible combinations of
capitalization, resulting in 8 distinct notes.
• Low # characters. The dictionary contains all combinations of three or fewer
lower-case characters. There are 17,576 unique notes in this list.
These dictionaries were created based on what we observed at least some participants
associating with a location. If a note does not fall into one of the above categories, it is
categorized as “Unclassified”.
The results of classifying both the user’s chosen notes and locations are summarized in
Table 3.2. Notice that the column for “High estimate - Unknown” shows the categorization
for the notes alone (since this location-password adversary model contains all possible
locations). In Table 3.2, we can see that 16 of the user’s notes fall into the “Unclassified”
category, meaning that they do not fall into any of the defined dictionaries. We observed
that some users chose phrases, sequences of words, mangled words (containing digits),
and even one user chose a random string. Surprisingly few names were chosen; only 3 of
the notes could be classified as names.
Note that there is some overlap between some of the note dictionaries in Table 3.2.




Note dictionary High Low
estimates estimates
U‡ K L U K L
COCA (all) 12 7 5 1 1 1
COCA (frequent) 5 3 3 1 1 1
Names 3 3 2 0 0 0
Location-specific 2† 1 1 0 0 0
Low # characters 1 1 1 1 1 1
Unclassified 16 10 2 2 1 0
Table 3.2 Categorization of the annotated location-passwords chosen by study participants.
Note that there is overlap between some of the note dictionaries (see text). † One was
prior to our recommendation to not directly label the location. ‡ U - Unknown, K -
Known, L - Local. Refer to Section 3.4.1 for a description of these location-password
adversary models.
contained in COCA. One of the location-specific words was “highschool”, which is also
contained in COCA.
Security of Notes Alone
We simulated a password cracking attack against the notes collected for the purpose of
(a) estimating the additional security they provide, and (b) comparing the notes to regular
passwords. We used two popular password crackers:
• John the Ripper (JtR [45]), a popular open-source password cracker. JtR was
configured to use a large password dictionary [15] while operating in wordlist
mode using default word mangling rules, followed by incremental mode.
• Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFG) [62], which generates a guessing
order that JtR can use. This method is considered to be better than JtR [31], but we
found was inferior to the other algorithms we used, and as such we do not report
on its results.
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• Semantic Guesser [59], which generates guesses based on the semantic and gram-
mar patterns of passwords. We run this guesser with and without word mangling
(which modifies capitalization on word boundaries). To date, this is the most
effective method at cracking passwords.
We used a large comprehensive password list as a dictionary available from Dazzlepod
[15]. JtR was configured to use this dictionary while operating in wordlist mode using
default word mangling rules. For comparison to the semantic guesser [59], we ran JtR
until it made 3 billion guesses. Wordlist mode would not reach this alone, so once the
wordlist had been exhausted we configured JtR to continue in incremental mode. We also
used a common wordlist called DIC-0294 as used by Weir et al. [59]. However, we found
that the Dazzlepod list outperformed this wordlist when cracking our notes. We discuss
potential explanations for this in Section 3.6.
PCFG required training prior to its use. In order to obtain the best results, PCFG
needed to be trained on a very large password list. We trained PCFG on the RockYou
dataset [49], since this is the largest available plaintext password list (32 million). We
configured PCFG to use the Dazzlepod list to generate our guesses based on the grammar
rules generated through training. PCFG generated guesses which JtR used to crack the
notes. The other two guessing algorithms far outperformed PCFG in terms of guessing
results, as such we do not ficus on these results.
As demonstrated by Figure 3.3, both JtR using the Dazzlepod dictionary and the
semantic guesser with word mangling rules applied (semantic_mangle) were the most
effective at cracking the most notes, each correctly guessing 63.33% (19/30 notes).
However, semantic_mangle started cracking much sooner than JtR (first cracked note was
at 1,000 guesses for semantic_mangle as opposed to 707,000 for JtR).
We compare the security of the notes alone (see Figure 3.3) with the security of
passwords in terms of percentage guessed within 3 billion guesses (see Figure 3.4). The
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Fig. 3.3 JtR and semantic cracking results against the notes.
security of the notes is comparable to that of the MySpace passwords (63% guessed
for notes vs. 65% for MySpace). However, the notes are not as secure as the LinkedIn
passwords (only 25% were cracked), which is not surprising as users were told that the
combination of note and location was their password.
We also used our note dictionaries (described in Section 3.4.1) to “guess” the notes.
However,we found the password crackers outperformed our note dictionaries, which is
why we focus on these results.
Security Estimate of GeoPassNotes
Next we evaluate the total combined security of GeoPassNotes, that is, the security of the
location and the note together.
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To perform a reasonable security estimate, we must consider how an attacker would
approach guessing an annotated location password. For optimal security, a GeoPassNotes
system should hash the combination of location and note (since both of them together
make up the credential), and not provide any feedback to the user until both have been
entered. This way, the attacker must then correctly guess both the location and note
without any feedback to indicate they have guessed the correct location.
A sensible approach for an attacker attempting to guess an annotated location pass-
word would be to guess the location component using the location dictionaries discussed
in Section 3.4.1, ordered based on their relative size and guessing efficiency, as follows:
(1) POI–local, (2) All land–local, (3) POI–known, (4) All land–known, (5) POI–unknown,
(6) All land–unknown. Of course, for each of the location guesses in this ordering, the
attacker must guess the note as well. An attacker should choose a maximum number of
annotation guesses to make per location (e.g., 3 billion), meaning that for each location
guess, they would guess at most this maximum number of notes. For each failed location
guess, they would need to guess exactly this maximum number of notes, even if one of
the note guesses were correct (as it is the combination of location and note that form a
password).
A sensible approach for an attacker attempting to guess a annotated location-password
would be to first guess the location component using the adversary models discussed in
Section 3.4.1 based on their relative size and guessing efficiency. This means they should
guess in the following order: low estimate local, high estimate local, low estimate known,
high estimate known, low estimate unknown, and end with high estimate unknown. When
combining the security of the notes with the locations, we take into account that the
attacker has exhausted all of the previous entries in this ordering.
The estimates in Figure 3.4 represent the total estimated security for all of the an-
notated location passwords gathered in our study. The number of total guesses for an
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Fig. 3.4 Results of GeoPassNotes security estimate compared with the semantic (with
mangling) attack against the MySpace and LinkedIn password sets.
annotated location password is computed by multiplying the number of guesses required
by semantic (with mangling) to guess the annotation with the sum of the sizes of all
location password dictionaries exhausted and half of the size of the last dictionary used.
We consider half of the last location dictionary as the annotated location password can be
anywhere within it (as the entries within each are not ordered). For example, to guess
an annotated location password whose location component exists in the All land - local
dictionary, the dictionary size would be the size of the POI - local dictionary plus 50%
of the size of the All land - local dictionary, times the number of the semantic attack’s
attempts to guess the corresponding note.
We compare our estimates for GeoPassNotes with the results of password guessing
with semantic with mangling against the MySpace and LinkedIn leaked password sets.
This will provide a baseline for the strength of text passwords in practice as compared to
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our conservative estimate of the security of GeoPassNotes. For the location passwords
that would be guessed by each of the POI dictionaries, only 3 notes were guessed. The
first POI annotated location password was not guessed until approximately 237 guesses
had been exhausted whereas > 30% of the MySpace passwords and > 4% of the LinkedIn
passwords were correctly guessed within 220 attempts.
The weakest two annotated location passwords are estimated to be guessed after 241
guesses (these two fell into our POI dictionaries), which is still much better than the
weakest passwords from both MySpace and LinkedIn data sets. A comparable number of
the LinkedIn passwords are guessed within approximately 223 guesses.
In total, 18 users chose places that they have been before, and thus their location
would be vulnerable to the known adversary attack without the note; however, only
8/18 of these would be guessed by our note dictionaries (refer to Table 3.2). Using the
password cracking approach, an attacker could successfully guess 13/18 notes for the
high estimate known threat model.
Other Security Considerations
As with many graphical password schemes, shoulder surfing is an inherent and apparent
weakness. We did not specifically conduct a shoulder-surfing study as it would only serve
to confirm the obvious; that the location element of the annotated location-password is
observable. Although adding notes to location-passwords strengthens their resistance to
shoulder surfing attacks, they seem as observable as a standard password. If an attacker
observes the location, they must still guess the note. Thus we have modelled this type
of attack in Figure 3.3, which represents the situation where the location part of the
annotated location-password has been compromised, and all that remains is the note.
Whether this is because the attacker guessed the location or shoulder surfed it is irrelevant,
the end result is still the same; the attacker must still guess the note. Through our analysis
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of note security (recall Section 3.4.1) we were able to conclude that the weakest note is
guessed in approximately 213 guesses. The strongest note that was cracked by JtR was
guessed in approximately 227 guesses. Some notes were not guessed in 232 (3 billion)
guesses.
Comparison to GeoPass Security
Through our analysis of locations, notes and the variety of data collected, we have been
able to distinguish what makes a good annotated location-password. One question we are
particularly interested in is “How much more security do annotated location-passwords
offer compared to the location-passwords of GeoPass [56]”. Table 3.1 provides the
security estimates for the location portions alone (from the annotated location-passwords)
under different adversary models (the same as in GeoPass [56]). The maximum security
offered by these estimates is the case where the attacker has no knowledge of the system
or user, and the location has no known or observable relationship to the note. In this case,
the security offered is 36.88 bits. However, when adding a note to the location, we were
able to increase the maximum security of the aforementioned case to approximately 65
bits. For the most insecure low estimate location-passwords, the security increased from
~16 bits to ~38 bits. Thus, it is evident that the introduction of notes greatly increases the
security offered by location-passwords. The benefit of having a note and password is that
they are both required to successfully login. If an attacker were to gather one of the two
(e.g., the note or the location, but not both), they would not be able to authenticate.
3.4.2 Usability Analysis
We discuss the memorability, acceptability, usability, and login times of the system,
comparing where appropriate to non-annotated location-passwords.
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Memorability
Our study demonstrated that annotated location-passwords have similarly high memora-
bility to non-annotated location-passwords [56]. We asked participants questions with
Likert-scale responses from 1 (strongly disagree), to 5 (strongly agree). The majority of
users (93%) reported no trouble in remembering their annotated location-password (as
demonstrated by Figure 3.5).
Fig. 3.5 Likert scale questionnaire responses to the associated questions pertaining to
memorability.
This response complements our analysis of failed logins, which indicated that over
the course of all three sessions, only 4/30 users had a failed login; overall, there were
very few failed logins (see Figure 3.6). Compared to GeoPass (which can be easily done,
as our study design, population, and population size mirrors that of the GeoPass study
[56]), GeoPassNotes have a a slightly higher number of login failures (22 vs. 19) but no
password resets (0 vs. 2).
No users forgot/reset their annotated location-password. When asked if they could
remember their annotated location-passwords for up to 3 and 6 months, most users (see
Figure 3.5) feel they would have no trouble remembering. In future work, it might be
interesting to include an additional session to test the memorability of annotated location-
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Fig. 3.6 Failed login attempts per session.
passwords over longer periods of time. We also asked participants if, at any point in time,
they wrote down a part of their annotated location-passwords. Four participants out of
30 (13%) mentioned they wrote down some part of their annotated location-password.
All four participants wrote down information pertaining to the name of the location they
chose. Two users wrote down the note they chose; one exactly and the other in his native
language. Another wrote down the countries and cities he saw on the map as he zoomed
into his location. The results of GeoPass do not indicate whether or not any participants
wrote down their location-passwords, although one user referred to their recording in
session 3 after experiencing a problem setting his/her marker [56].
Acceptability
We asked participants questions with Likert-scale responses from 1 (strongly disagree),
to 5 (strongly agree). Most users agreed that they would use this method for some of their
accounts if they knew it was more secure than passwords (see Figure 3.7c).
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Fig. 3.7 Likert scale questionnaire responses to the associated questions pertaining to
acceptability.
When asked if they would use this method for most of their accounts, most remained
neutral, neither agreeing or disagreeing (see Figure 3.7a). However, most (90%) users
agreed they would use it for some accounts (see Figure 3.7b). One user mentioned that
while the login times are longer, she would still prefer to use the system because of the
security that it offers. There are other users that commented on the security as well,
stating that it is a “better and more secure way of creating passwords”.
We also asked participants a number of questions relating to their experience with
GeoPassNotes. When asked how difficult it was for them to use the system, the majority
of users reported not having any difficulty (see Figure 3.8c). Despite the increased time
to login, users seemed accepting of the system, one of which mentioned “Even though it
takes longer, I would use it because it is more secure”. Other comments included “fun”
and “a cool way to authenticate”.
Usability
Further complementing our use-case of infrequently used accounts (e.g., once per week),
the majority of users (90%) indicated that they could easily use this method every week
(see Figure 3.8b). Very few reported that the method was difficult to use (see Figure
3.8c). More users indicated they could easily use the method every week than every day
3.4 Results 54
most likely because 40% of users reported that this method was too time-consuming (see
Figure 3.8d). Furthermore, most of the users (76%) reported not having any difficulty
navigating back to the location they chose (see Figure 3.8f). We plan to explore ways to
make annotated location-passwords less time-consuming.
Fig. 3.8 Likert scale questionnaire responses to the associated questions pertaining to
usability.
Login Times
On average, login times were 32, 37, and 47 seconds for session 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
These averages are raised by five users with long login times (> 150 seconds). As such,
we also examined the median login times which were 26, 33, and 36 seconds for sessions
1, 2, and 3, respectively. The login times for GeoPass (Figure 4 from [56]) can be directly
compared to Figure 3.9; GeoPass median times are lower than that of GeoPassNotes (by
1, 3, and 11 seconds for session 1, session 2, and session 3 respectively).
We also note that there were interesting qualitative observations from our study that
may have contributed to some of the outliers in our times analysis (see Figure 3.9).
One participant answered a phone call at the beginning of the login phase, which led to
increased login time. The network in the laboratory that we ran our experiments in had a
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great deal of latency; it took a long time for some users to load Google Maps, resulting in
increased login times. Network usage on the campus meant that there was a great deal of
jitter in the amount of latency, so unfortunately it is difficult to quantify a specific delay.





































Fig. 3.9 Login times for each session.
3.5 Resulting System and Policy Recommendations
Based on our findings, we suggest a set of recommended policies for future implementa-
tions of annotated location-passwords. These recommendations are as follows:
• Avoid choosing a location that you have previously worked or lived.
3.5 Resulting System and Policy Recommendations 56
This recommendation is intended to prevent users from choosing locations that are
easily guessed (i.e., the known and local adversary models). The results of our study
indicate that all users followed the recommendation not to choose a location previously
lived or worked at. This was a positive result, and it did not seem to affect the overall
usability of the system. As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the first user directly labelled
a location (the names of two intersecting streets). As such, we also recommend the
following policy:
• Avoid directly labelling a location in the note (e.g., do not note Daytona Beach
with “Daytona” or “beach”).
We used this recommendation for the remainder of the study, which prevented the
majority of users from labelling their locations. Similar to our previous recommendation,
the usability of the system did not appear to be affected in any way, while the security
was vastly increased. One user of our study also chose a three character note. We did not
disallow this as part of the study was to collect a distribution of notes and see what kinds
of things users note locations with. As such, we recommend the following policy:
• Avoid choosing a note with a low number of characters (e.g., less than 4).
We plan to implement proactive checking for these policies in future versions of
GeoPass-
Notes. Disallowing short notes is easy, but the others might not seem as obvious. Using
Google API’s built in tools, we can perform on-the-fly checks of the location (e.g.,
suppose a note is set on the CN Tower, and the user tries to note it with “CN Tower”, we
can prohibit this by performing a reverse geolocation of the coordinates of the marker and
seeing that the CN Tower in Toronto, Canada was selected). This is easily done as Google
Maps API allows extensive customization with regards to geolocation. The response to a
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reverse geolocation request would be an array consisting of different address components
(e.g., formatted address, short name, long name, postal code, etc.). In our example of
the CN Tower, the note “CN Tower” would exist in the long name of the array returned
by the reverse geolocation request. Alternatively, the user’s note could be entered in the
Google Maps Search API to see if the location is the same as the note text.
Enforcing that a user does not choose a place lived or worked before is more challeng-
ing. Relevant information could be collected as part of the registration/enrollment process
such as a user’s city of birth. Then, it would be possible to restrict markers placed in
that location. The local adversary model could be easily prevented through a coordinate
lookup based on IP geolocation results.
3.6 Discussion
We found that annotating a location seems to slightly improve memorability, (GeoPass
had 19 login failures [56], vs. 22 for GeoPassNotes); also, GeoPass had 2 passwords
reset over the study, vs. 0 for GeoPassNotes). This raises the question of whether the
notes might actually help users remember their locations. Our initial thoughts were that
an event-specific memory combined with a note would create a highly memorable way
for users to authenticate. However, after gathering results from our study, we noticed that
some participants randomly chose places that looked interesting on the map. This could
be due to the formation of the land, unique or funny words, or just randomly zooming
into a place until they found one they liked. Therefore, it may be possible that it is not the
significance of the location, but rather locations in general that people remember. This
leads us to consider whether annotating a randomly generated location might yield the
same positive results that we have seen with GeoPassNotes? This is an interesting future
area of research we plan to explore.
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In order to determine the security that notes alone provided, we ran various password
cracking algorithms against them using two different input dictionaries: a comprehensive
wordlist[63] and Dazzlepod’s dictionary of the most common passwords [15]. Contrary
to our expectations, using the Dazzlepod dictionary in these cracking algorithms cracked
the most of the notes (63% compared to 43% with the DIC-0294 wordlist). Many notes
were also observed to have a strong similarity to passwords. While we did not give any
password policies or guidelines relating to the notes, it seems that many of the notes
resembled more of a password than a word. This is an interesting topic to further examine
in the future.
In our questionnaire, we asked users why they chose the note they did. We also
analysed if there were any observable relationships between the note and the location.
From this, we were able to say that 24 out of 30 users’ notes held significance for them
to the location in some way. However, it is interesting to look more deeply into user’s
individual associations between notes and places as they are generally not apparent to
others; only 2 notes had an observable association to the location. This implies that while
the note is somehow associated, it is not easily tied to the location by anyone but the users
themselves.
We also noticed that the majority of users seemed to navigate to their chosen locations
the same way every time. In the interest of determining whether a user’s journey could
be used to enhance the strength of GeoPass and its variants, we analyzed each user’s
navigation strategies across every session to see if this could be an added security
requirement.
To evaluate this, we considered the sequence of navigation events (e.g., click, drag,
double-click, search, or scroll) as the journey. We then tested the journey from the
location password confirmation for equality with the journeys collected in each session.
If we were to require the exact journey to be used for logins, then 70%, 63%, and 60% of
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users would have successful logins. Even though we did not enforce this in our study, we
were interested if it could potentially be added in the future as another login requirement.
Our findings indicate it is not consistent enough to be a usable login requirement (there is
too much variance in the way users navigate back to their location from login to login).
Next, we evaluated how many users would successfully authenticate if the subsequent
journey was off by at most one navigation event. For example, if the journey was (drag,
double click, search), then (drag, search) would also be accepted. This changed the results
to be 98% successful login rates across all three sessions. However, the security impact
of this requirement would be very little.
After all of the research we have conducted on using locations to authenticate, it
is not clear why locations are so memorable. Is it the location itself, a special event
and/or memory that occurred, or something else? One interesting idea is that users might
be remembering parts of the journey associated with their location. Sometimes, when
humans are driving, searching for a location, they can recall where they are going based
on their experiences along the way (e.g., turn right at the big tree, then left at the second
stop sign, and finally it’s the third house on the right). Since the majority of users use
the same journey for each login, it might be the key factor in making GeoPassNotes so
memorable. It would be very interesting to research this more, and discover if the user’s
journey effects the memorability of the location they end up choosing.
3.7 Conclusions and Future Work
We implemented and evaluated a security enhancement for location-passwords called
GeoPassNotes. Through a 30 person user study, we found that annotated location-
passwords remain as memorable as their non-annotated counterparts, however yield much
more security against attacks when our recommendations are applied. Compared to
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unannotated location-passwords [56], we found notes only slightly increase login time.
Although annotated location-passwords are highly memorable, and may have stronger
security than text passwords, it is still only a viable option for accounts where logins are
infrequent (e.g., to replace the role of text passwords or secondary/fallback authentication
in financial accounts, where logins have been found to average 1.3 times/week [26]). This
is because login times for GeoPassNotes are high (median login time 26-36 seconds) vs.
under 10 seconds for traditional passwords. The results of our study also show that users
are most open to using this system once/week.
Future work includes studies to gain a better understanding of why annotated location-
passwords have such high memorability as the reasons may potentially help inform




Despite their inherent weaknesses, password usage has not declined in the past few years
[12]. They are still the most widely used form of authentication due to their deployability
and simplicity [35]. However, we have entered an age of evolution with regards to
computers and the Internet. Every year, computers become faster, smarter, and smaller,
allowing attackers to have more tools at their disposal. Many organizations are finally
becoming more aware of the dangers of dealing with passwords. However, they still
continue to be used. The current state of Internet security is a tradeoff between security,
usability, and deployability [10]. Every decision that is made is a balance between how
easy it is for the end user, how much protection is offered, and how easy it is to deploy.
Typically, systems will excel in one type of benefit, but lack in others (e.g., passwords
excel in deployability but not as much in security [10]).
In order to counter against attackers, many sites now implement strict password
composition policies and procedures. Some of these include multiple password segments
required, password history restrictions, and password length requirements. It is also
recommended that participants use a different password for every site they visit. These
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recommendations make it nearly impossible for participants to create and remember all
of their passwords (up to 30 in some cases).
We have also seen pushes to develop alternative authentication schemes that are more
memorable than passwords. Some of these are graphical password schemes, like the
one we presented in Chapter 3. The goal of these systems is to authenticate easily using
different authentication tokens for each site. The interference of these different tokens
does not appear to be an issue when distinct background images are used for each account
[13]. Graphical passwords are very memorable, but their use is limited due to exaggerated
login times compared with passwords. They also suffer from shoulder surfing attacks, an
issue that isn’t as much of an issue with passwords. Passwords are the most widely used
[35], but are not a good option going forward. Password cracking approaches continue
to become better and more efficient, promoting administrators to enforce more strict
password policies [20]. This results in unsafe coping strategies such as password reuse,
minimally different passwords, and writing passwords down. As such, we were interested
in increasing the security of passwords with little or no reduction in their memorability
such that participants can remember more passwords without needing to reuse the same
one.
We designed and implemented a system called PassMod to strengthen participants’
passwords in meaningful ways to increase memorability. The purpose of PassMod is to
take a user’s initial, weak password, and suggest a modified version of that password to
the user. The modifications performed are not just character or case changes, but rather
word-level changes. PassMod analyzes and interprets the meaning of the participants
original password, and tries to make suggestions that are meaningful and sensible. We
hypothesize that if the suggestions make sense to the user, they will be easier to remember.
This system is our effort at trying to increase security of passwords without sacrificing
the memorability of the original password. The semantic attack of Veras et al. [59]
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is currently the best known cracking method, capable of cracking previously unseen
passwords. PassMod is an effort at trying to create a password that is secure against the
attacks described by Veras et al. [59].
We conducted an online user study to test the usability and security of PassMod to try
to recreate how participants use passwords in an everyday situation. The study contained
three sessions held over the course of 8-9 days. In total, 43 participants completed session
1, 42 participants completed session 2, and 35 participants completed all three sessions.
Participants were also invited to partake in an optional session 4 held one month after the
completion of session 3; 26 participants completed this session. Of the original set of
participants in session 1, 72% were female and 27% were male with the majority (~52%)
being between the ages of 20-25. The results indicate PassMod is not only effective
at increasing the security of passwords, but also at retaining the memorability of the
original password. Of the 35 participants that completed all 3 sessions, 2 (5%) forgot
their passwords and chose to reset after 3 failed attempts. Out of the 43 total participants,
6 (14%) forgot their passwords and had to reset. In total, 8/43 (19%) admitted to writing
down some or all of their passwords. Of the 26 participants that returned one month
later, 21 remembered their password and 5 forgot (8 of these participants had previously
secure passwords). The majority of participants (52%) agreed that they could easily use
this method every day, and 64% would if they knew it was making their accounts more
secure. More than half of participants (54%) also found this system easy to use. 58% of
participants thought this system would make their accounts more secure.
PassMod differs itself from other password modification systems through its use of
password analysis. PassMod first parses participants’ passwords to learn their semantic
structure. Using this structure, PassMod will make one or more modifications, but tries
to preserve the memorability of the original password by modifying it in a way that
preserves the semantic structure, which hopefully makes sense to the user. Previous
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approaches were solely focused on increasing security and resistance to guessing attacks;
our method focuses on security and memorability, not just one or the other.
We also conducted an analysis to test the security of the passwords output by PassMod.
The system was able to significantly strengthen participants’ passwords. Previous attempts
at strengthening passwords have been known to be conducive to certain types of attacks
[47]. Previous attempts have also been seen to have more of a focus on security rather than
memorability. Our approach focuses on maintaining the memorability of the password
while also increasing its security. Houshmand et al. [27] did not conduct a usability study;
as such, we cannot compare usability metrics between PassMod and their strengthening
approach. Forget et al. [21, 22] conducted a user study to test their password modification
system. Their system contained five different experimental conditions representing
different types of modifications performed. Participants were tasked with creating and
confirming a password, completing a questionnaire, and then logging in with their
password. This is very similar to the structure of our session 1, as such, we only compare
those results. The results indicate that memorability was very high, with login rates of
98%, 93%, 99%, 98%, and 94% for all 5 of their experimental conditions. These success
rates are higher than those collected in PassMod which saw login rates of 86% for session
1. Forget et al. indicated there were very few login failures throughout the course of
their study (as indicated by their high success rates) but do not explicitly state how many
password resets there were. Furthermore, they do not mention if they collected data on
whether participants wrote down their passwords or not. When we look at the security of
the passwords output by their system, none were able to be cracked by John the Ripper
operating in dictionary mode within 40 million guesses; PassMod was able to strengthen
passwords to the point that most popular password crackers were only able to crack,
at most, 5% of strengthened passwords within 3 billion guesses. While slightly more
strengthened passwords were able to be cracked in PassMod, we used a larger number of
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cracking techniques, which are currently considered the best [30]. The initial passwords
input by the PassMod system were on average 10 characters long and 33% percent were
able to be cracked, whereas the strengthened passwords collected from our study were, on
average, 15 characters long and none could be cracked using the same method of Veras et
al. [59]. The best attack against the strengthened passwords came from PCFG, cracking
5% of them within 3 billion attempts.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a detailed
overview of the system such as how it analyzes and interprets passwords, modifies a
password, and evaluates modifications; Section 4.3 describes the user study we conducted
to collect real use data from participants that tested our system; Section 4.4.1 analyzes
the theoretical and practical security of the system; Section 4.4.2 describes the usability
results of our user study; and Section 4.5 talks about reasons for design choices that were
made, implementation decisions, and usability-security tradeoffs.
4.2 System Design
PassMod was designed with the purpose of making a password more secure without
sacrificing memorability. When a user chooses a password, they go through a thought
process, an internal selection process that combines the user’s perceived security of the
site and a password they can remember [11]. We aim to preserve the memorability of
the original password. Our system interprets the password that was typed, and looks
for other words, structures, or variations of the original password that are less probable
among a large set of collected passwords. The goal is to keep the newly suggested
password as similar to the original as possible, while increasing its security. The following
sections provide a brief overview of the interface and design choices, explain how the
underlying system works at a high level, how we analyze the user’s password, followed
4.2 System Design 66
by a description of the exact modifications we make to the password to make it more
secure.
4.2.1 Interface Design
Through preliminary pilot testing with experienced computer participants, visualization
specialists, as well as non-technical participants, we were able to refine the interface to
be as user-friendly and approachable as possible. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the interface
we created as well as an example of a modification output by the system after a user has
entered a password.
Fig. 4.1 Modification of the password “barkingdog5” displayed to the user in the PassMod
system.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the most notable design choice is the use of different, distinct
colours to represent the different segments of a participants suggested password. Also
present are three buttons allowing the user to submit their passwords, generate a new
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suggestion from the original password they entered, or start over from scratch (taking
them back to the start).
4.2.2 Grammar Generation
The underlying system is based on the semantic cracking system and grammar of Veras
et al. [59]. Their system is capable of cracking previously unseen English passwords
with greater success rates than the previously best known methods (PCFG [27], JtR [45])
[30, 59]. As such, we were interested in creating a system that could resist the cracking
efforts of the semantic cracker. PassMod uses the same underlying password grammar
as the semantic system of Veras et al. [59]. The password grammar is trained on a large
collection of passwords (RockYou, MySpace, Yahoo, LinkedIn, Gawkr, phphBB, and
eHarmony). The grammar is generated by segmenting the passwords into constituent
terminals (words, digits, and symbols), classifying segments into non terminal semantic
categories (e.g., NN_animal, VB_movement), then training a shallow PCFG to learn
probabilistic grammar rules which will produce the observed structures. We also use
some external resources for assisting in strengthening participants’ passwords in the event
that the grammar is not sufficient. We use WordNet to find synonyms of words in the
event that no synonyms can be found in the grammar (further described in later sections).
We also use COCA to ensure the suggestions we make are part of the top 75,000 most
common words (three times humans average vocabulary size [41]). This ensures that the
suggestions we make are at least common enough in the English language to make sense
to the user. There are many words that participants might not have ever seen before, and
we do not want to make suggestions using those words. The process of generating the
grammar is detailed below.
The first step in generating the grammar is finding a very large collection of passwords
to train it on. For our system, we decided the more passwords we could acquire, the better.
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As such, we collected RockYou [49], Yahoo [5], LinkedIn [6], eHarmony, MySpace[49],
Gawkr [37], and phpBB [49]. This resulted in a total of 40,558,327 passwords. Hav-
ing more passwords from different websites is beneficial as it provides a larger, more
comprehensive grammar. If our grammar was only generated from one password set
(i.e., RockYou), the grammar would be influenced by that that collection’s password
policy. As such, any password created with a different policy in mind would not have its
strength accurately assessed using the password grammar. We opted for a larger password
collection using a multitude of password sets containing different password policies
so we can accurately assess the strength of new passwords. The choice of using these
specific password collections is because they were available in clear text (i.e., not hashed
/ encrypted).
We use the same password grammar generation process as used by Veras et al. [59],
as outlined in the following paragraphs.
For each password, the first step in generating a grammar that would be beneficial to
us was to parse the passwords. Parsing is the process of determining the most probable
structure of a password. It takes place in two phases. First, the password is segmented
into the most probable syntactic components (words, numbers, symbols, etc.), then the
grammar is used to determine the most probable rule which could generate the observed
password. The initial segmentation step works by computing all possible segmentations
of the input password and then by using COCA unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams to find
the most probable segmentation. We refer to all of the segments that make up any given
password as the password segment set. Each segment set is stored in a database and
linked to the original password it was produced from.
The next step is to part of speech (POS) tag each segment. Part of speech tagging is
used in creating structures of passwords. A base structure (or structure) is a grammatical
representation of the password and its segments. For example, the password “ilovebob”
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can be divided into its segments “i, love, and bob”. Once each of these segments are
tagged, they can be put together again to form a base structure. In order to create a
structure, we must know whether each segment is a noun, verb, or gap. A gap segment
refers to a non-word segment, such as numbers or symbol. Segments are tagged using
a combination of taggers including Claws [23], WordNet [9], and a backoff tagger [9].
The POS tags are stored in the database and also linked with the original password and
segments.
After we have the segments and POS tags for all of the passwords, we must generate
semantic categories and eventually, base structures. This stage takes the POS-tagged
segments and builds a rule for the password. This stage also uses dictionaries of words
to try to assign more specific categories to groups of words. For example, we used a
dictionary of cities to assign cities this category. Suppose the password “ilovebob2012”
was input. This password would be divided into its segments “i, love, bob, 2012”.
Next, each non-word segment (referred to from hereon as a “gap” segment) would be
POS tagged “{i->ppis1}{love->vvz}{bob->mname}”. All of the results are stored in
a database and linked with the original password. Once all of the structures are stored
in a database, a generalization function is performed to generalize more specific words.
For example, the word “husky” would most likely not become its own category. This
word can be encompassed by a more general term such as “dog” or “canine”. This
generalization is user-specified, and is used to influence a tree cut using Li and Abe’s
Tree Cut model [39]. We conducted tests to determine which cut would be the most
appropriate for our purposes. In order to do this, we generated four different grammars
based on four different tree cuts: specific, normal, general, and very general. We then ran
password cracking attacks against the LinkedIn and MySpace passwords to test which
grammar would conduct the best cracking attack. Our motivation behind using a password
cracking attack is that an attacker would likely use the grammar that performed the best
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for cracking purposes. As such, we want to use the same grammar for creating more
secure passwords. It was seen that the very general grammar performed the best, so this
is the one we went with. This resulted in more general structures (e.g., canine instead
of husky). It also resulted in extremely common words such as “love” having their own
category.
Each category is referred to as a “nonterminal”, and is based on the level of tree cut
used. The nonterminal is essentially a placeholder for words, numbers, characters, etc. in
the password’s rule. For each nonterminal, a list of possible substitutions (i.e., terminals)
is compiled. These are the words that can be substituted in for the given nonterminal, each
containing probabilities relative to one another. Since the probabilities of the terminals
are only relative to others within the same nonterminal category, the grammar is known
as “context-free”. For example, suppose we have a noninterminal vvis.love. The only
word within this nonterminal set is the word “love” with a probability of 1.0. The reason
the probability is 1.0 is because there are no other words in the training data that share
the same nonterminal category.
A parser is then trained on the base structures, learning a PCFG which gener-
ates passwords. A “structure” here can be thought of as a single level grammar rule
(password→structure) in a traditional PCFG. Structures are all segments of a password, in
order, assigned a probability that is relative to all other structures (i.e., total_structures).
Any time a structure is generated more than once (e.g., from two different passwords),
the probability of that structure increases. The more probable a structure is, the weaker
the password that uses that structure will be. This process is done for all sets of segments
(once for every single input password). The same algorithm also creates lists of words
(i.e., terminals) for each given category (i.e., nonterminal). The words are parsed out of
all of the input passwords. These words are then assigned a probability relative to all
other words in the same list. For example, one list may contain all nouns, whereas the
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probability of each noun is relative to the total number of nouns in that list. In another
example, we have the semantic category “vvz_s.love”. In this case, the word “love” was
seen so many times in the password grammar that it has been assigned its own category.
The only word in this list is “love” and it is assigned a probability of “1.0”. The total
number of words contained in each list is referred to as nterms.
The collection of all rules, nonterminals, terminals, and associated probability infor-
mation is referred to as the “password grammar”.
4.2.3 High-level Description
Once the password grammar has been generated, the next step is to assess a participants’
password and determine if it needs strengthening (see Figure 4.2).
The password grammar described in Section 4.2.2 is used in this work to:
Assess Password Strength. Determine if a user’s password is weak or strong by
computing the probabilities of all its segments and comparing to a predetermined
threshold.
Modify Existing Password. If a user’s password is deemed weak, modify it by using
a sequence of insertions / modifications until the overall probability falls below a
prespecified threshold.
The high-level modification algorithm operates in the following way:
Stage 1a,b,c. User enters their password for strength to be assessed. The password
grammar is loaded for use in determining password probability and generating
suggestions. WordNet and COCA resources are loaded for use in later stages.
Stage 2. Check the initial password against a blacklist of ~3,500 of the most common
passwords (described further in Section 4.4.1).
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Fig. 4.2 Flowchart describing the PassMod strengthening algorithm.
Stage 3. Check the probability of the password against a threshold to see if it is above
the threshold and requires modification.
Stage 4a,b,c. Perform a randomized modification to the original input password to get
a modified password.
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Stage 5. Recheck the probability of the modified password. If the password’s strength
does not meet the required threshold, call the main function again using the modified
password as the input password.
The result is a modified password with a guaranteed probability lower than the
threshold. This password is suggested to the user.
The following sections describe the stages of the strengthening algorithm as they
appear in Figure 4.2:
Stage 1.
The user first enters their password to be assessed. During the process of assessment,
various resources are required by the system which are also loaded during this time.
Theses resources include WordNet synsets, COCA unigram, bigram, and trigram lists,
and the password grammar itself. In this case, only the “very general” grammar is loaded
as we evaluated it to provide the best information for our purposes (recall Section 4.2.2).
The password grammar does not need to be loaded into memory in order to function,
however, we found that we were able to significantly speed up the process if all of the
resources were available in memory rather than on disk.
Stage 2.
The user’s password is first checked to see if it is contained on a blacklist of common
passwords. Through pilot testing and our own trials, we determined that very weak initial
passwords required a great deal of modification in order to make them secure. This
resulted in unusable password suggestions. As such, we implemented a blacklist check to
the initial passwords input by the participants. This blacklist contains the top 3,500 most
common passwords (see Section 4.4.1 for a description of why this list was used). If the
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user’s password is found on this blacklist, the password is rejected and the user is asked
to select a new password.
Stage 3.
Individual participants’ passwords are analyzed in much the same way the grammar was
generated. All of the same steps must be performed such as parsing the password into its
n segments, classifying the segments, and generating a base structure from the classified
segments. The total probability of a user’s password is represented by the following
formula:
Prob(password) = Prob(structure)∗∏ni=1 Prob(n)
The first step is to parse the password grammar for the base structure that was created
to see if it exists. If it does exist, the probability of that base structure is used for
structure probability (where totalstructures is the total number of structures generated
by the password grammar). If it does not exist, a probability of 1/(totalstructures+1)
is used for structure probability. This effectively gives the structure a probability slightly
lower than the lowest probability seen in the password grammar. Since the structure
in question was not found, it means it was not present in any of the passwords in our
password collection. As such, since it was not seen, it should have a lower probability
than something that was only seen once. This is why we divide it by the total number of
structures + 1. Next, each segment of the parsed password (referred to as a “terminal”) is
searched for in its corresponding nonterminal set in the password grammar. Similar to
base structures, if the word is found in a list of all words (totalterminals), the probability
associated with that word is used. If it is not found, the probability is 1/(totalterminals+
1). The total probability of the user’s password is computed as the product of the
individual terminal probabilities and the probability of the base structure.
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The probability of the password is then checked against a predetermined threshold
of 1.080935×10−12. This value was computed as the result of a non-linear regression
model (see Figure 4.3) using the total number of guesses an attacker could make in a
4 month effort (see Section 4.4.1 for a detailed explanation of where this value came
from and our threat model). If the probability of the participants password is below this
threshold it is deemed “previously secure”, as in no modifications are required. If the
password is above the threshold then a strengthening technique must be performed to
lower the probability of the password.
Fig. 4.3 Non-linear regression model to forecast guess probability [59].
In an effort to make passwords more secure, PassMod makes any one of three modifi-
cations (chosen at random) to the original password. These are structure rearrangement,
structure addition, or terminal modification. The only constraint is the same modification
technique will not be performed twice in a row (a unique modification is performed at
each iteration). Each of these is described in their own sections below. See Table 4.1 for
examples of each modification and a brief description of the modification.
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Type of Modification Example Description
Structure Addition iloveschool1999 → Inserts a segment found in
from Grammar iloveschoolmemories1999 a structure that was seen in
password grammar
Structure Addition barkingdog5 → Backoff method that uses a
from Bigram quitbarkingdog5 common bigram and adds
a new segment
Structure Rearrange ilovebill2012 → Takes the original structure
2012billilove and rearranges it
Terminal Modification ironman76 → Swaps a weak word with a
from Grammar ironpatriot76 more secure one found in
grammar
Terminal Modification dancinginrain → Swaps a weak word with a
from WordNet paradinginrain more secure one found in
WordNet
Table 4.1 Examples of each modification type performed by PassMod.
Stage 4a: Structure Rearrangement
One of the potential modifications performed is structure rearrangement. The primary
form of structure rearrangement uses the existing grammar. There is no backoff method
for structure rearrangement. The only constraint for structure rearrangement is the
probability of the structure entering this function must not be the minimum probability
for structures. The probabilities of the structures are computed based on how many of that
structure was seen in the original password dataset. If the structure in question was only
seen once, it would have a probability of 2.48×10−08 (1 / totalstructures). Structure
rearrangement is only useful if there was more than structure comprised of the same
categories. In this case, structure rearrangement has the potential to rearrange the existing
password to a different, less probable structure. Thus, if the probability of the structure
of the participants’ password is the lowest, the function returns early.
Structure rearrange from grammar attempts to find a rearranged form of the orig-
inal password already in the grammar. For example, the password “ilovebob2012”
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has a structure of {ppis1}{vvz_s.love}{mname}{number4}. This structure is present
in the grammar and has an associated probability. However, there could be other
different structures with the same set of categories in the grammar as well, such as
{ppis1}{number4}{vvz_s.love}{mname}. This would yield the password “i2012lovebob”,
which could have a lower probability than the original. The main motivation behind this
is if we can find a rearranged form of the password somewhere in the grammar, it means
at least one other user thought this was a good password structure (since the grammar was
trained on passwords). If this is the case, we can assume this newly rearranged password
is more memorable, semantically meaningful, and syntactically sensible than randomly
rearranging the structure. The first operation performed is to compute all permutations
of the original structure. This is done by breaking the password into its segments (e.g.,
“ilovebob2012” becomes “i, love, bob, 2012”). All permutations of these segments are
then computed. The base structures for these permutations are found, and then parsed.
Of all of the matching structures that are found in the grammar, a random one is selected.
This is the new structure that is to be used for rearrangement. The user’s original password
is then rearranged according to this structure.
One potential security issue with this function is if one (or very few) rearranged
structures were found in the grammar. Whenever this function is called for that password
(or one with the same structure), the same rearranged structure(s) would be used. This
is being avoided by requiring at least 5 previous matching structures being found in the
grammar before one is selected. If there are fewer than 5 possible suggestions, structure
rearrangement is not used. If our rearrange function uses the same structure every time
for a password, the suggestions are just as weak as the original.
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Stage 4b. Structure Addition
Structure addition has the largest impact on the overall password and reduces the
guessing probability the most (most of the time, we are adding entire words at a
time). The primary method tries to expand a password using structures that were
seen in the grammar previously. For example, the structure for “ilovebob” would
find “ilovebob2012”, or “ilovebobsummers”, as potential matches. The reason is be-
cause structure addition parses structures in the grammar where the original structure
is seen as a substructure of the new password. In our example, the original struc-
ture for “ilovebob” ({ppis1}{vvz_s.love}{mname}) is seen in both of the other sugges-
tions “ilovebob2012” ({ppis1}{vvz_s.love}{mname}{number4}), or “ilovebobsummers”
({ppis1}{vvz_s.love}{mname}{nn2_season}). The primary method only works when
the original structure was found as a subset of another in the grammar. If it does not,
there is an alternative method for structure addition that is used. The backoff method
adds structures from a nonterminal bigram model. For example, one structure from the
passwords rule is selected (“love” in our example of “ilovebob”). Bigrams containing
the word “love” are searched, and one is randomly selected from that set. One potential
addition could be “reallylove”, in which case the resulting password suggestion would be
“ireallylovebob”. The added structure can occur after the original word (as in the above
example) or before the original word. There are no constraints for structure addition, it
will operate as expected for all passwords.
Structure addition from grammar only works if the original structure was found as a
subset of another structure in the grammar. The reason is structure addition parses all
occurrences of the original structure in the grammar. It tries to find structures where the
original one is a substructure of another one (e.g., the structure for ilovebob would find
ilovebob2012). It is worth noting that the substructure must occur exactly in the new
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structure; the structure cannot be split up. This means that the structure for “ilovebob” can
only find structures where words / gaps are added to beginning, end, or both beginning
and end of the substructure. Each structure found is added to a list, and a structure is
randomly selected from that list to be used. Similar to rearrangement, structure addition
suffers from the same weakness if only one (or very few) structures are found. For this
reason, if 5 or fewer structures are found, the backoff method is used (described below).
In line with our goal, we want to make passwords more secure, and less guessable. If we
add the same structures every time, we are limiting our resulting password space to be
very small, and very guessable, which is not what we want. This would allow an attacker
to exercise whats known as a “guided bruteforce (GBF) attack”. A GBF occurs when
the resulting password space is so small that the attacker can simply just bruteforce all
possible modifications and guess them all. We enforce this requirement such that the
resulting password space is large enough to resist a GBF attack.
There are a few restrictions in place for selecting structures from grammar. One, is that
only special character insertions of length one are used. More than one special character
adds complexity to the password and can make it very difficult to remember. Furthermore,
more than one gap segment will not be used. For example, only a structure that contains
at most one added special, char, or number will be used. From our initial testing, we
found that multiple gap segments make the resulting passwords very unintuitive to the
end user.
After a structure is selected, the original password is substituted into the correct
parts of the structure (e.g., {ppis1}{vvz_s.love}{mname}{number4}{aa}{nn1} would
become ilovebob2012{aa}{nn1}). Now we must find specific words for the newly added
structures ({aa} and {nn1} in this example). In order to find a word that is a part of the
structure in question, we need to look in the corresponding lists for each rule generated
by the grammar. These lists contain all of the words that were seen in the original
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password set that are a part of different nonterminal categories. For example, the list for
mname (male name) will hold all words that have mname as a categorization, each with a
probability of occurrence. The relative probability of the word in question can be used to
determine the overall probability of the password.
Structure addition from grammar is a very useful enhancement to the user’s password
because the guess probability is reduced significantly with very little change to the
original password. Most of the time, the new structure makes sense, and works with the
existing password. All of the structures that are added come from previous participants’
passwords, so we assume the structure is memorable since it was used at least once
before.
The backoff method for structure addition is structure addition from a nonterminal
bigram model of frequencies. The nonterminal bigram model was created from all of the
password sets used in training the grammar. All structures in this set were parsed into
their bigram segments and input into a frequency distribution. The result is a frequency
distribution of nonterminal bigrams, which can be used for structure addition. When this
method is required, a random structure is selected from the current participants’ password.
For example, if the user’s password is “ilovedogs”, the random structure chosen could be
{ppis1}. A list of all bigrams of the nonterminal bigram model that contains the unigram
{ppis1} is created. From this list, a random bigram is selected to be used for structure
addition. The bigram that was selected is parsed into its two unigram segments. The
unigram that did not exist in the original password is inserted into the structure of the
password. We ensure the inserted word is within the top 75,000 most frequent words
according to COCA so that it is a human readable word. A terminal is then selected
for the added structure. Similar to structure addition from grammar, special character
structures are restricted from suggestions. Also, number and char structures are restricted
to fewer than 4 characters. Since any special or char insertions are allowed, there were
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cases where up to 20 random sequences of characters could be added. As such, we needed
a way to keep the insertions to a reasonable length, a length that could be remembered
with little difficulty. It is worth noting that the COCA filter is only used in the cases where
a word is being added. If a number or special character is added, this is not checked for
in the COCA list.
Stage 4c. Terminal Modification
Terminal modification is the final modification type we make use of in the system. The
primary method is terminal modification from grammar, whereby the new terminal must
appear in the grammar, in the same list of nonterminals as the original word. The backoff
method is WordNet terminal modification, where the original word is swapped with a
related word in WordNet found through a hyponymy relation. The word selected by
WordNet must also pass the COCA filter of the top 75,000 words.
Terminal modification first precomputes a list of all children of the grandparents
(from WordNet) of the most probable word and the second most probable word of the
participants password. The reason for spanning up to the grandparent level is to try to
keep the modification semantically relevant whilst also creating a larger list of terminal
modifications to choose. These lists are used to verify future suggestions as being
semantically relevant to the original word. Terminal modification uses two words of
the participants original password, the most probable and the second most probable. To
prevent the most probable word in each password being chosen for modification every
time (therefore making the modifications deterministic), there is a 50% chance the second
word will be chosen for modification instead of the first. The reason for this is to increase
the total suggestion space of the resulting suggested passwords.
For example, if a user inputs the password “ironman76” instead of always selecting the
most common word for modification, either one of the top two most common words can
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be selected. In our example, the resulting password suggestion could be “galliumman76”
if the word “iron” was modified, or “ironpatriot76” if the word “man” was selected. By
randomly deciding to either use the most probable or second most probable word, we
effectively increase the resulting suggestion space for this input password. This is another
reason why we selected the very general treecut. With this cut, it is less likely we will
encounter more of these situations where a terminal is the only one in its category. This
is because a more general cut will produce fewer categories with more words in each
category.
Once the words for modification are decided, the nonterminal file for the new most
probable word is read. Each line of this file is added to a list only if the word appears
in the WordNet set that was precomputed. At the end, we have a list of all terminals
that appeared in the WordNet set. A random modification is selected, inserted into the
password in the location of the bad terminal, and then the probability is recomputed.
This will happen 20 times, or until a secure password is found. 20 was chosen as the
number of modifications to try since the process of modifying and testing the security
of the new password is time-consuming. Through our own trials, it was found that 20
iterations could be performed in a reasonable amount of time. The 20 iterations only
applies to trying to find a suitable terminal. There is no limitation to the total number
of rounds for the entire program – only the threshold check at the beginning of each
iteration. Computing the new probabilities is not as simple as multiplying the probability
of the new terminal into the password. The reason for this, is with a different word in
the password, the parsing of the password could change entirely, changing the overall
probability of the password. As such, the newly modified password must be input into
the probability checker system to have a probability assigned. If no secure password is
found, the second most probable word goes through the same process. If no suggestion is
viable, the backoff method is used.
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The backoff method selects a terminal from a set of all children of the grandparent
(according to WordNet) of the original word and tries this in the probability checker
system. This is also tried 20 times, or until a secure password is found.
Stage 5. Reassess Probability of Password
After a modification has been performed, the probability of the overall password is
reassessed (this time with the modification included). If the probability of the password
is below the specified threshold, the password is suggested to the user. If the probability
is still higher than the threshold, another modification is selected and performed on top of
the previous one. Eventually, the probability of the password will be below the threshold
and the password can be suggested to the user.
4.3 User Study
We conducted a 43-person multi-session online user study to test the memorability and
usability of PassMod. First, we pilot tested the system with 7 experienced and 3 casual
computer users. The main motivation behind the pilot test was to iron out any obvious
design flaws in the system and to improve the user experience prior to running a full
study. Aside from fixing minor bugs in the system, two obvious design choices came
from the results of our pilot study:
• Colour-coded Password Suggestions. After a couple of trial cases, we began to
notice that when strings were inserted into the middle of the password, and the
entire password was displayed in black, the word boundaries were harder to see,
making it more difficult to see the exact insertion / modification. As such, we
presented each segment of the password in a new colour.
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• The Shuffle Button. Multiple participants from our pilot test mentioned not liking
their initial password and wanting to “shuffle” or select a new modification (without
starting over). As such, we added a button that provides this functionality.
One user from our study even commented in the post-questionnaire (at the end of the
study) about the colour-coding, stating “the color coding helped a lot”. This confirmed
to us that presenting each segment in a different colour was a useful design decision. In
order to compare the usability and memorability of our study with annotated location-
passwords and regular passwords, we used the same study design as seen by Thorpe et al.
[56] and Al Omari et al. [4].
4.3.1 Sessions
This study consisted of three required online sessions that spanned the course of 8-9 days
and one optional session one month later:
Session 1 (day 1, online). Participants were tasked with creating and confirming a
password of their choice. Participants were not told this password would be
strengthened at the time of creation, and were not given any password policies to
adhere to. The password they entered was subject to a blacklist check to determine
if the password was too weak to modify (discussed further in Section 4.4.1). In the
event the password was present on the blacklist, participants were informed their
password was too weak and told to enter a new password. If the password was
not present on the blacklist, it was analyzed by the PassMod system. If the guess
probability of the password, as determined by the system, was below a prespecified
threshold, the password was deemed “Previously Secure”. In this case, the system
did not need to make any modifications to the password. If the password was
above the threshold, the system made as many modifications as needed to bring the
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strength of the password below the threshold. In this case, participants were then
required to type and confirm the password they were suggested. Following a brief
background questionnaire regarding participants’ password habits, participants
were asked to login with their password. Failure to do so resulted in participants
being given the choice to to reset their password (after 3 failed login attempts)
or being forced to (after 10 failed attempts). Successfully logging in with their
password completed session 1. Fourty-three participants completed this session.
One user opted out after failing three logins in session 1. This user did not comment
on their reason for opting out.
Session 2 (day 2, online). Participants were asked to login with their password one
day later. The purpose of this session was to model the frequency of logging
into a frequent account (one that is accessed approximately once per day). If the
participants failed their login and had to reset their password in session 2, they
were asked to come back again the following day to login again. A successful login
completed session 2. Fourty-two participants completed this session.
Session 3 (day 8-9, online). Participants were then tasked with logging into the system
with their password approximately one week (7-8 days) after successful completion
of session 2. The purpose of this session was to model the frequency of logging
into an infrequently used account (approximately once per week [35]). After
successfully logging in with their password, participants were asked to complete a
short feedback questionnaire asking them about their experience with the system.
Thirty-four participants completed this session. It is worth noting that 5 participants
communicated that they were still interested in continuing the study and logging
in for session 3, but they simply forgot or did not see the reminder email in time.
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This indicates they did not drop out because of a flaw with the system, but that they
were more likely preoccupied and did not have the time to complete the session.
Session 4 (day 38+). Participants were invited to participate in an optional login at least
one month later (30+ days after session 3). Participants were not compensated for
this optional session, but instead were entered into a separate draw for another $50.
26 participants completed this session.
4.3.2 Environment
All sessions of the user study were held completely online, from wherever the participants
wished to complete them. Participants were sent a reminder email informing them of
when they were allowed to login and how long they had to complete the session.
4.3.3 Participants
Fourty-four participants were recruited to partake in this study via an email broadcast to
all students. Only non-IT students were selected for participation in the study. This was
to avoid a heightened awareness of what makes a secure password. We were primarily
concerned with getting results that are representative of the average computer user.
Participants were given $10 to complete the study and entered into a draw to win $50.
Through the use of a background questionnaire, we were able to collect demographic
information about the participants. Our study consisted of 12 male and 31 female
participants, all university students between the ages of 18 and 40. The majority were
between the ages of 20 and 25.
4.3 User Study 87
4.3.4 Limitations and Ecological Validity
One issue with the parsing algorithm is it is based on COCA unigram, bigram, and
trigram models as well as coverage of the English language. Most of the time, the parser
correctly identifies the segments of the password. However, there are anomalies in which
the correct segmentation is not found. This results in this parsing being used for POS
tagging and for semantic classification. Since the probability of the password comes from
the segments individual probabilities, the probability may be incorrect. More work will
need to be done on the parsing algorithm to try and perfect it. However, give that this is
a computer application trying to parse passwords into English segments, some error is
likely to be expected. In our study, we did not experience a scenario where the incorrect
parsing was used. We did notice this a few times in pilot testing, however.
Online studies have their advantages such as the ability to collect data from larger
sample sizes. However, given that this is the first iteration of PassMod, we opted for a
smaller study in order to identify any areas of the system that could be improved before
using a larger sample size. Fourty-three participants gives us enough data to enhance
the system and its features before running a larger scale study. One drawback to a fully
web-based user study is the lack of qualitative data we can collect. We can openly report
what participants tell us as we were not there to observe their behaviour / interaction with
the system. We did notice abnormally high login times (with no failures) for a couple of
participants. We can hypothesize that the user might have been distracted with something
else at the time they were completing the study, which contributed to the long login
time (>8 minutes). We wanted to collect results that were as representative of typical
password habits as possible, and did not want the participants to feel the pressures of a
lab environment where they were being watched.
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Since our participants were recruited from a university campus, even though they
were not directly enrolled in IT programs, they may have a heightened awareness of
what makes a secure password. Due to this reason, it is possible that our study collected
slightly more secure passwords than those of the average computer user.
4.4 Results
This section presents the results of our study. First we discuss the theoretical security
of PassMod. This includes our theoretical threat model and how we have designed our
system to resist the attacks mentioned in Section 2.3 (see Section 4.4.1). Next, we analyze
the empirical security of PassMod by running a guessing attack against the sample of
passwords we collected in our user study. In Section 4.4.2 we discuss the usability,
memorability, and acceptability results collected from our user study.
4.4.1 Security Analysis
A secure password can be defined as providing a sufficient amount of security such that
all common attack vectors are thwarted. The main attacks we focus on preventing in this
discussion are the semantic attack described in Chapter 2 and guided brute-force attacks.
We limit our focus to these attacks as they are the most comparable to the types of attacks
that would affect the system we have designed and implemented.
Threat Model
We assume the attacker is a computer user with high end, but affordable computer
hardware. Our attacker has a workstation that contains an Intel Core(TM) i7-5820 CPU
running at a clock speed of 3.30 GHz. This system contains 32 GB of 2333 MHz DDR4
RAM. According to previous literature [20] a best effort attacker would use clusters of
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1000 GPU’s to crack passwords with. However, we base our calculations on the above
computer specs in a cluster of 1000 alike computers. Florencio et al. [20] also assume
that for an offline attack, a password guessed in 4 months is considered weak. A realistic
password policy could be to enforce a password change once every 4 months.
We assume the system deploying our software has adequate defences in place. As
such, the hashing method used is Bcrypt [20], with a cost of 15 applied. Each workstation
is able to compute 0.55 hashes / second. The entire 1000-pc cluster is thus able to compute
5,840,000,016 hashes during the 4-month campaign. In order to generate all possible
guesses from our system, it would take a very long time and an extremely large amount
of memory. As such, we generated a non-linear regression model that is capable of
estimating the guess probability of the n-th password generated by the semantic cracker.
We use this model to estimate the probability of the 5,840,000,016th password which
yields 1.080935× 10−12, our probability threshold for determining a strong or weak
password.
Prevention of Pitfalls in Automated Strengthening Algorithms
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, previous approaches to password strengthening had pitfalls
of PCFG cracking attacks and guided bruteforce attacks. PCFG cracking attacks occur
when the password cracker is trained on a leaked database of strengthened passwords.
If the attacker was to try to crack strengthened passwords using passwords that were
previously strengthened by our system, there would most likely be an increase in success
rate. Guided bruteforce attacks occur when the resulting password space from suggestions
is so small that an attacker can very quickly bruteforce all suggested passwords for a
given input password. However, many measures are in place to ensure the password space
of suggested passwords is large. In PassMod, each modification is chosen at random
from a large pool of possible modifications, which means the same suggestions are very
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unlikely to reoccur. In previous literature, modifications are chosen at random based on
the previous structures that were seen in the training data (insert digits at the beginning
or end). Our system utilizes this same method, but also contains a backoff method of
new structure addition. In this scenario, a structure is added to the previous structure,
creating a new structure that was not seen in the grammar previously. Furthermore,
previous literature contained systems where there was a limit on edit distance (1 or 2
characters), however, our system is inserting entire words, sequences of digits, chars,
and numbers. Our preventative measures ensure the resulting password is more secure
against an attack than in previous literature [47]. The fact that we are not making single
character edits, but rather entire word-level / structure modifications coupled with no
restrictions on number of edits, makes our system more resilient to PCFG-based attacks.
Prevention of PCFG-based Attacks. If an attacker was able to recover a leaked copy
of the strengthening database, there would be no gain. The reason is that strengthened
passwords are not entered into the database. A leak would only yield the structures and
dictionaries of the weak passwords, which does not yield any additional information that
the attacker would not already have from publicly available data. Given that leaked data
of strengthened passwords could be used to mount an effective attack, it is probably best
to not insert any strengthened data into the database. The main motivation for this in the
approach of Houshmand et al. [27] was to keep the system adaptive, and always changing.
By inserting data obtained from strengthened passwords or already secure passwords into
the database, the criteria for a secure suggestion would change over time. For example, a
password that is secure today might not be secure tomorrow, as it has been inserted into
the database and assigned a probability. If anything is to be inserted based on the newly
strengthened passwords, it should only be the structures. Schmidt et al. [47] demon-
strated that partial data used in a PCFG-based guessing attack did not yield successful
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results. We did not make our system adaptive because of the number of possible modi-
fications for each password. With an average of ~1048 suggestions for each password,
even if an attack was able to learn the probability distribution of the passwords output by
the system, it would be very difficult for them to crack a significant number of passwords.
Evaluation of Guided Bruteforce (GBF) Attacks. A guided bruteforce attack is
made possible when the password space of the suggested passwords is so small, that an
attacker could exhaust it in a reasonable amount of time. The GBF attack assumes that
the original, unstrengthened password the user enters is inherently insecure (which is
the motivation for using this system in the first place). We assume that in any case, the
unstrengthened password in question is weak, and can be guessed in little to no time.
Now that the attacker has the original password, they will try to brute force all of the
suggestions that can be made for that password. This section focuses on findings from
previous literature regarding systems’ weaknesses to GBF attacks as well as preventative
measures employed by our system.
Previous literature [20] has shown that an original password with a guess probability
weaker than 10−9 could be guessed in less than 1 minute. An original password with
a guess probability weaker than 10−12 could be guessed in less than 2.2 hours (using
12-core Intel i7 CPU 3.2 GHz and MD5 hashing). As such, the only resistance to guessing
the participants password would be the time it takes to brute force all of the variants
of that password (all of the suggestions the system could make with that password as
the base). Schmidt et al. [47] state that in order to completely thwart a GBF attack, a
stronger initial password is needed as well as a minimum of two edits. As more edits
are performed, the run time for a GBF attack to execute increases. Our implementation
does not just perform one edit. This system recursively calls itself, passing the previously
strengthened password as input to the next iteration. The result is a password that has
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been recursively modified until a certain threshold has been reached. The general trend
appears to be 1-2 random edits (see Table 4.2) that are expected to be different every time,
further resisting GBF attacks with every additional edit made.
According to previous literature [47], it was found that a user’s original password
must have a guess probability of at least 10−12 in order to completely thwart GBF attacks.
However, it was also mentioned that this is a very high hurdle to expect participants to
overcome. Initial implementations of our system used a blacklist of the top 2 million
passwords, which translates to 10−8 guess probability [15], however, we learned very
quickly through initial testing this blacklist became tedious when participants needed to
select an initial password. Passwords with multiple segments were blacklisted due to the
comprehensiveness of the blacklist. This led us to investigate more deeply the issue of
the blacklist and whether it was actually needed or not. We decided to run our own GBF
attack against all of the suggestions our system can generate for the top 1 million RockYou
passwords. This was done three separate times, once with no blacklist at all applied
to initial passwords, once with a small blacklist applied (3,559 of the most common
passwords provided by John the Ripper [45]), and once with our initial comprehensive
blacklist applied (Dazzlepod [15]). Since a guided bruteforce attack would exhaust all
possible suggestions for the input password, the user’s resulting password would be
cracked. We assume the expected case for the attacker’s guessing effort would be to
exhaust half of the possible suggested passwords before cracking the user’s real password.
The actual number of guesses could vary, sometimes being fewer or greater than the
average. We evaluate the effectiveness of the guided bruteforce attack in each different
condition based on how many initial RockYou passwords end up being cracked as a result
of the cracking effort.
A large component in the effectiveness of a GBF attack is the initial ordering of
the attacker’s guesses. When running a GBF attack, attackers do not simply make
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arbitrary guesses, but rather make guesses that are highly probable in order to crack as
many passwords early on as they can. As such, we initially ordered the guesses in our
simulated GBF attack by password guess probability (as output by our system). However,
we decided this was not representative of how an attacker might order their guesses.
An attack would want to crack as many passwords as possible early on. In order to
crack a password, the attacker must bruteforce all of the suggestions produced by that
password. As such, we decided to order the attacker’s guesses based on the total number
of suggestions ascending. This means the attacker would try to crack passwords that only
have a few possible suggestions first, which would take no time at all. In the end, the
attacker will be trying to crack passwords that contain billions of suggestion possibilities,
which will slow their attack down significantly near the end.




















Passwords Cracked - GBF
Passwords Cracked - GBF with Blacklist (short)
Passwords Cracked - GBF with Blacklist (long)
Fig. 4.4 RockYou passwords cracked as the result of a guided bruteforce attack using three
different blacklists. The vertical line is drawn at 1021 to indicate the number considered
crackable by an offline attack.
Obviously, the best case for security of the system and the participants’ passwords
was seen with the use of the large blacklist. However, it was not justified that this much
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of a blacklist was needed, for we might be able to achieve comparable security with the
use of a much smaller, less comprehensive blacklist. Furthermore, since our system is
different in the way it operates and makes modifications to a user’s password, a blacklist
might not even be needed.
The values we use for our results were chosen based on suggestions and conclu-
sions drawn from Florêncio et al. [20]. Their results indicate that at 106 guesses, the
effectiveness of an online attack is severely reduced whereas at 1021 the effectiveness
of an offline attack is severely reduced. As such, we evaluate the effectiveness of our
cracking effort at benchmarks of 106 and 1021 guesses. As seen in Figure 4.4, at 106
guesses, an insignificant number of passwords were cracked. Therefore, it is safe to
assume our system provides adequate protections against an online guessing attack. At
1021 guesses, we start to see a difference in terms of a blacklist versus no blacklist. When
no blacklist is applied, 8.48% of passwords have been cracked compared with 3.09% with
a comprehensive one. At 1072 guesses, we really see the true strength of the blacklist,
as only 13.1% (4,281,446 passwords) of passwords were cracked compared with 53.3%
(17,369,986 passwords) without a blacklist. It is extremely unlikely an attacker would
ever make it to this point given the computing time and memory stipulations of the
system. Since Florencio et al. [20] state the efficacy of most offline attacks is reduced
after 1021 guesses, we discuss that point. Based on these results, it would seem that a
strict blacklist is not needed in all cases. At 1021 guesses, there is not a large enough
difference in terms of overall passwords cracked to justify the decrease in usability of
the system. We would like to note that in some cases, security may be desirable over
a decrease in usability. As such, the security required by the type of account must be
taken into account when determining the size of blacklist to be used. We decide to use
the small blacklist (only containing ~3,500 entries) as it prohibits participants from using
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the weakest of passwords (e.g., password, 123456, etc.) while also limiting the efficacy
of a guided bruteforce attack.
Another way PassMod prevents a GBF attack is by the number of suggestions possible
for each password. We ran a simulated GBF attack against the top 1 million passwords of
RockYou to see how many suggestions each contained. The results indicate the average
number of suggestions for each password was ~1048. The time and computing resources
required to generate that many guesses indicates a GBF attack would not be effective.
Figure 4.5 shows the total number of suggestions for each of the first 1 million passwords
in RockYou. Given the large number of suggestions possible by the PassMod system, it
would be interesting to analyze if providing participants with their original password as a
password hint would be a security risk or not.
Fig. 4.5 Total number of suggestions for each of the top 1 million RockYou passwords
and how many passwords in RockYou would have been cracked.
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Practical Security
Through the use of a theoretical security analysis, we were able to show that this password
modification system is more resilient to the types of attacks that made its predecessors
weak. The design choices we made make this system more resistant to guided bruteforce
attacks and guessing attacks. However, it is one thing to make this claim and another
to demonstrate it. Figure 4.6 demonstrates the effectiveness of three different password
cracking algorithms against the passwords collected in our study. The algorithms we
chose were JtR in wordlist mode (followed by incremental mode) [45], PCFG with a
dictionary of common passwords as input [63], and the semantic guessing system of
Veras et al. [59]. In each case, the cracking algorithms ran until 3 billion guesses had
been exhausted. As shown by Figure 4.6, the semantic cracking system was the strongest
performer, cracking up to 33% of the original passwords collected in our study. This
was followed by JtR which was able to crack 27% and PCFG cracking 19%. However,
once the passwords were strengthened by our system, the efficacy of these attacks drops
dramatically. The semantic system was unable to crack any of the strengthened passwords,
which makes sense as it was the semantics underlying algorithm that strengthened the
passwords. Even with JtR and PCFG, very few strengthened passwords were able to be
cracked within 3 billion guesses. These results demonstrate that the system strengthens
participants’ passwords to levels that are able to withstand current state-of-the-art attacks
against passwords.
The PassMod system was also able to significantly increase the length of participants’
starting passwords. The average length of the original passwords in our study was 10
characters. Once modified, the average length of the passwords increased to 15. These
extra 5 characters came using a variety of strengthening methods ranging from adding a
single word to the beginning, middle, or end, up to adding a word, two symbols, and a
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Fig. 4.6 Guessing results of three different algorithms against the original and modified
passwords collected from our study.
digit (see Table 4.2 for a complete list of modifications performed and sample passwords).
Table 4.2 indicates a potential bias towards structure addition over other strengthening
methods. Structure rearrangement will only be performed if a rearranged form of that
structure is available in the password grammar and has a lower probability of the current
structure. Similarly, terminal modification will only be used if the word to be modified
comes from a category that has other words with lower probabilities that would lower the
overall probability of the password below the threshold. This is something that requires
further investigation in the future.
4.4.2 Usability Analysis
In the section we discuss the usability, memorability, and login times of the PassMod
system. 34 participants completed the third session of our user study; however, 12
of these participants entered passwords that were previously secure (i.e., the system
did not need to make any modifications to the original). As such, we only report the
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Modification % of Total Example
+ 1 word 49% ilovebob → ireallylovebob
+ 1 word, digit 5% jellotime → jellotime76
+ 1 word, symbol 8% barkingdog → quitbarkingdog!
+ 1 word, symbol, digit 3% highschool1 → imhigh19school1!
+ 2 words 21% jackolantern → jackolanternnightynight
+ 2 words, 1 digit 3% schooltime → schooltime29downlow
+ 3 words 3% mydogs76 → seemydogs76appletree
terminal modification 5% ironman76 → ironpatriot76
rearrangement 3% ilovedogs2012 → 2012dogsilove
Table 4.2 Modification samples of the PassMod system.
usability questionnaire results of the 22 participants that actually needed a modification
to their original password. For the optional session 4, we report on the memorability data
collected from the 26 participants who completed the session; 8 had previously secure
passwords and we differentiate where appropriate.
Usability
Participants were asked in the post questionnaire multiple questions pertaining to the
usability of PassMod. Overall, participants self-perceived usability was good, with the
majority stating that they would prefer to use this system if they knew it was more secure
than regular passwords (see Figure 4.7c). Furthermore, the majority of participants
disagreed that the system was too difficult to use and was too time-consuming.
We were also able to collect some useful usability data from the participants overall
comments about the system. For example, a couple of participants stated “If the system
provided more options, it would make it easier for me to pick which one i would like
as I would pick the one i could remember the easiest” and “Perhaps one will stick out
more to me from a list of options, and I like having the possibility personally”. Both of
these comments indicate the participants would have preferred to see a list of multiple
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Fig. 4.7 PassMod questionnaire responses to the associated questions pertaining to
usability.
password suggestions. Then they can choose the one they like the most instead of having
to shuffle for a new password suggestion.
This led us to analyze how many participants actually used the shuffle button to
acquire a new suggestion. Of the 42 participants that completed sessions 1 and 2, a
total of 7 participants shuffled their suggested password: 6 in session 1 and 1 in session
2. We investigated the concerns of the two participants that commented stating they
wished more suggestions were shown to them. Neither of these participants pressed the
shuffle button. This indicates they either a) couldn’t be bothered, or the more likely,
b) they didn’t know it was there. Another comment read “I think this system helped
create a password that I wouldn’t have otherwise thought of myself”. One of the positive
aspects of this system that separates it from other password suggestion / modification
system is meaning. The system attempts to preserve the meaning behind the original
password by parsing out its structure and then either inserting / modifying segments to
create a stronger password. Since the modifications are based on previous password
grammar, the suggestions are closer to password language than English language. As such,
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Fig. 4.8 Number of shuffles per session for the PassMod study.
one potential avenue of future work could be creating a grammar of English sentences
and using those structures to strengthen passwords. Then, we may end up with more
grammatically correct sentences, which may, in turn, be more memorable.
We asked participants whether they preferred password creation rules or the password
suggestion system they used in the study. The majority (59%) responded they prefer
password creation rules. We hypothesize the reasoning behind this is they have one or
two passwords they use for every account (which two participants stated they did in
the comments) and they did not want to have to remember a new one. We also asked
participants if they wrote down any part of their password during the study. 24% stated
they wrote down something about their password in the study. Of the participants that
responded to our questionnaire question about what they wrote down about their password,
5 participants said the entire password, and 3 participants wrote down the modification.
One user’s remark “However I was surprised that even though I wrote down the password
I only had to look at once, by the time the second survey came I knew it by heart which
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was shocking to me” indicates the user expected to forget the password, but it ended up
being memorable to them. We were also interested to see if participants were content
with the number of modifications required to make their original password secure or if
they did not like it. The majority (71.4%) stated they were okay with the number of
modifications because they knew it was making their password more secure.
Memorability
We measure the memorability of PassMod by examining the login rate for each session.
As seen in Figure 4.9, the majority of participants did not experience any failed logins
throughout the course of the study. Furthermore, only 6 participants forgot their password
and had to reset throughout the course of the study. The login rates per session were
86%, 66%, 74.5%, and 72% for sessions 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. For session 4, we
only report the login rate for the 18 participants that had a modified password; the total
login rate for session 4 was 77%. Furthermore, we also collected data on participants
who logged in on their first attempt each session (of those that successfully logged in).
84%, 74%, 78%, and 100% of participants successfully logged in on their first attempt for
sessions 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively (compared with 92%, 75%, and 81% for traditional
password for sessions 1, 2, and 3, respectively [4]). The average number of login attempts
before a successful login was 1.16, 1.17, 1.14, and 1.00 for sessions 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. This is slightly better than in traditional text passwords where the average
number of attempts before a successful login was 1.23 [4].
We asked participants through the use of a feedback questionnaire, how many wrote
down their passwords. If they did, we also asked them what about their password they
wrote down (i.e., the entire thing, the modified segment, etc.). In total, 8 participants
(24%) wrote down at least some part of their password. The majority of those participants
(75%) wrote down the entire password with the other 2 just writing down the modified
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Fig. 4.9 Number of failed logins per session for the PassMod study.
component. This compares with traditional passwords where 25% of participants wrote
down their passwords [4].
We were primarily interested with what makes a password memorable or forgettable.
As such, we decided to investigate what the passwords looked like for participants that
experienced failed logins compared with participants that did not experience any difficulty
with the system. The results of this analysis indicate the majority of failed logins were
due to what we could observe as typos. Further analysis indicates that all participants
that had any number of modifications to their original password were able to successfully
login. The majority of the failed logins (58%) can be attributed to slightly mistyped
passwords (one or two characters swapped or incorrect) and participants that typed their
original password instead of the modified one. Only 6 (19%) failed logins across all
3 sessions were arguably due to a memory lapse (see Table 4.3). Approximately 6%
of passwords were “previously secure”, meaning the password the user typed into the
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Reason for Failure (sessions 1, 2, 3) % of total
Previously secure 6.3% (2/31)
Typed original password 26% (8/31)
Typed only modification 6.3% (2/31)
Slight typo 35% (11/31)
Largely incorrect 19% (6/31)
Capitalization 6.3% (2/31)
Reason for Failure (session 4) % of total
Previously secure 20% (3/15)
Typed original password 20% (3/15)
Largely incorrect 60% (9/15)
Table 4.3 Different types of failed logins for the PassMod user study.
PassMod system already met the threshold, and did not require any modifications. Also
of note from Table 4.3 is the fact that 26% of participants attempted to login with their
original password when they were provided a suggestion. This is one potential area
of future work of trying to reinforce remembering the suggested password and not the
original one. It is also possible that some of the login failures were due to the increased
length of the strengthened passwords (~15 characters up from ~10). Session 4 saw 5
participants forget their passwords; 1 user incorrectly recalled their previously secure
password (i.e., it did not undergo any modifications), 1 user typed their original password,
and 3 participants typed incorrect passwords.
We also report on the memorability of PassMod through the use of questionnaire
responses collected as well as login rate throughout the study. The responses we received
from the questionnaire indicate that participants do not feel they could remember their
passwords for a long time. This could be due to password reuse, and the introduction of a
“different” password goes outside the participants comfort zone of memorability. Just over
half of our participants indicated they could remember their passwords for another month.
After that, the results drop down for 3, 6, and 12 months (see Figure 4.10defg). Almost
all participants disagreed they would never forget their password (see Figure 4.10h).
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However, we hypothesize that this is representative of any new password, not specifically
the ones generated by our system. Session 4 was aimed at modelling the frequency of
logging into an account one month later. Of the participants that completed session 4 that
required a modification (18/26), 13 successfully recalled their passwords (72%). These
participants also did not experience a failed login, successfully authenticating on their
first attempt. 3 of these participants admitted to writing down their entire passwords. 3 of
the participants that failed their session 4 login also reported writing down a part of their
passwords (the first password, the modified component, and the entire password).
Fig. 4.10 PassMod questionnaire responses to the associated questions pertaining to
memorability.
Contrary to the questionnaire results, many participants commented about the system,
stating that it was memorable and a good experience. Some of the comments received
from multiple participants were:
• I like this system, instead of me trying to come up with a password for the password
creation rule, the format of entering a password and having it modify for me was
quite convenient. Most generated passwords are too lengthy or generic to memorize,
but modifying a password I already know makes remembering it much easier.
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• I really liked this system since sometimes it’s hard to think of a password and I
know it’s not good to use the same password for everything but I’m forgetful so I
do it anyways. However I was suprised that even though I wrote down the password
I only had to look at once, by the time the second survey came I knew it by heart
which was shocking to me. Overall great survey experience.
• The suggested password was too long, although it did include a fairly memorable
suggestion.
Interestingly, the general trend in the comments seemed to be the suggested passwords
were memorable. It was also noted the system was able to suggest a modification that was
interesting and memorable to the user, and was one they would not have thought up on
their own. Another remark states that most generated passwords are lengthy or difficult
to remember, but making a suggestion based on a password the user already knows is
much more memorable. The last comment demonstrated a situation where this user
thought the password was too long, but it was still memorable. The main purpose of this
work is to strengthen a participants password in a way that makes sense to them without
reducing the memorability. One user stated “I felt that the password generator was vague.
They suggested a name to me that I had no connection with. I base my passwords on
things that are meaningful to me (but could never be guessed). I was given a name that
had no meaning to me, and that would make it hard to remember”. This indicates that
maybe there is some future work pertaining to the memorability of password structures.
For example, what structures are the most memorable; what semantic categories are the
most memorable? If we can determine which structures tend to be more memorable,
we could modify the password suggestion system to only suggest memorable structures.
Furthermore, we could also suggest a category and ask the user to come up with a
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meaningful word for that category (e.g., insert an animal at the end of the password).
However, with this comes a reduction in security.
Login Times
Another way we can measure usability of the system is by the login times per session.
The times collected for session 1 creation and modification are larger than the remaining
sessions as this is when the user was first creating their password and viewing any
modifications made. The average for creation and modification was 27 and 31 seconds,
respectively. Creation time refers to the user first entering and confirming their original
password. Modification time refers to when a user is presented a modified password and
they must type and confirm it. Thus, the average time PassMod adds to the password
creation process is estimated to be approximately 31 seconds. The login times for sessions
1, 2, 3, and 4 logins was 12, 11, 12, and 11 seconds, respectively. However, these times
are slightly inflated due to outliers. This is also seen by the fact that the median login
times per session is 11, 9, 9, and 9 seconds for sessions 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Given
the nature of an online study, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not there were any
external factors contributing to login times. There are a couple of outlying login times
(496s, 181s) where the user did not experience any failed logins. These indicate the user
may have been distracted with something else at the time of completing the study.
4.5 Discussion and Future Work
As this is the first iteration of this work, there are many segments that still need to be
researched. This section will explain the differences between PassMod and previous
literature as well as briefly describe some of the areas we have identified that could be
investigated further.


































Fig. 4.11 PassMod login times per session.
4.5.1 Comparison to Previous Strengthening Techniques
In Chapter 2 we provided an overview in the area of password modification systems. The
system we primarily compare ours with is that of Houshmand et al. [27]. Their approach
takes the probabilistic context-free grammar of Weir et al. [62] and use it to try and create
a more secure (i.e., less probable) password. Our method also uses PCFGs but has been
expanded to include semantic categories as well. The following paragraphs differentiate
our approach with that of Houshmand et al. [27]. We primarily focus on security as
Houshmand et al. did not conduct a usability analysis of their system.
Houshmand et al. [27] evaluate the effectiveness of their password strengthening
approach by simulating a password cracking attack against the strengthened passwords
and already secure passwords collected in their study. The results indicate that JTR was
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able to crack 1% of these passwords and PCFG was able to crack 5% within 43.2 billion
guesses (using MD5 hashing). The results from our study were very similar to this; JTR
was able to crack 3.33% and PCFG was able to crack 5% within 3 billion guesses (using
bcrypt). We also ran the semantic cracker against the same set of passwords and found
that after 3 billion guesses it was completely ineffective (cracking no passwords).
Housmand et al.’s strengthening system contains much of the same functions our
system uses. For example, the first step in their algorithm is to parse the password into
its base structure. Next, an operation is either performed on the structure itself (similar
to structure addition and structure rearrangement in our system) or on the individual
segments (similar to terminal modification in our approach). The key difference is what
is accepted as a modification. Houshmand et al.’s system operates a the character level,
making 1 or 2 character modifications to segments. They refer to 1 and 2 edits as an edit
distance of 1 and 2, respectively. Some examples they provide are inserting a number to
the beginning, modifying the segment “## →!#”, or removing a segment entirely. Our
approach operates at the segment level only. This means we add segments to the structure
and then substitute in a word or number for that segment. Furthermore, we also analyze
the base structure and try to insert a word that makes sense with the rest of the password.
This process is further explained in Chapter 4.
One other key difference between our approach and that of Houshmand et al. is
the cracking method. Houshmand et al. deemed a password to be secure if its guess
probability fell below a given threshold. They determined that threshold by simulating
a password cracking attack using a PC with a Core 2 Duo processor and MD5 hashing.
As such, they can claim that if a passwords guess probability falls below the threshold,
it would withstand one day of cracking. We do not believe this is representative of
“passwords in the wild”. The specifications for our cracking workstation was an Intel
Core(TM) i7-5820 CPU running at a clock speed of 3.30 GHz with 32 GB of 2333 MHz
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DDR4 RAM. The hashes we were cracking were Bcrypt hashes, which are currently the
best known hashing method [20]. According to previous literature [20] for an offline
attack, a password guessed in 4 months is considered weak. We created our threshold
with these guidelines in mind. As such, if a password is strengthened using our system,
we can guarantee it is secure against a semantic guessing attack that has been running
for 4 months (assuming similar hardware as in our attack). Given that we used a more
powerful system, a more realistic hashing method, and a realistic password change policy,
we have tried to develop our system to be as realistic as possible given current best
practices. Houshmand et al. did not conduct a usability analysis of their system and as
such, we cannot know how usable their method is.
Aside from the practial security of Houshmand et al.’s system, there are two other
attacks that automatically strengthened passwords are susceptible to; a PCFG-based
attack and a guided brute-force attack. Schmidt et al. [47] found that Houshmand et al.’s
system was susceptible to these attacks whereas PassMod has been modelled with these
attacks in mind. PassMod is not adaptive, and does not enter any new information into
the database after training (making it resistant to a PCFG-based attack). Furthermore,
PassMod contains an extremely large possible suggestion space for each password (an
average of 1048 suggestions per password) which makes a GBF attack more difficult to
run (as time requirements is a large factor in the effectiveness of these attacks).
We also compare to the password strengthening method of Forget et al. [21, 22].
Forget et al. randomly insert characters into a user’s password to make it more secure.
They conducted a usability and memorability analysis and found that when participants
started with an already strong password, the resulting “strengthened password” was very
unusable. As a result, participants began to intentionally input weaker original passwords
to get usable suggestions. The login rate for their study was very high, averaging well
above 80%. For some of their more complex modifications, login times were longer than
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for PassMod (10.2 and 18 seconds for 3 and 4 additions, respectively). Even though the
login success rate seems to be slightly better than exhibited with PassMod, the passwords
strengthened by PassMod were able to withstand much more realistic password cracking
approaches. The password cracking attacks conducted by Forget et al. indicate that no
passwords could be cracked within 40 million guesses [21]. However, this was using John
the Ripper in dictionary mode. The cracking techniques used in PassMod were state-of-
the-art according to Ji et al. [30] and even then, only 5% of the strengthened passwords
could be cracked within 3 billion guesses. Furthermore, our approach does not randomly
insert components into the participants’ passwords. Instead, we analyze the password
and try to pick the most sensible location for addition. This is primarily based on the
password grammar which is based off of passwords that participants have chosen. We
believe that if a password was previously chosen by a user, it is assumed to be memorable
to that user. If we can use that knowledge to make a more sensible addition, we can
attempt to preserve the memorability in the original password moreso than randomly
inserting a character. As indicated by Schmidt et al. [47], there are other attacks against
automatically strengthened passwords that make them weak; a PCFG-based guessing
attack and a guided bruteforce (GBF) attack. Forget et al.’s system would be vulnerable
to a guided bruteforce attack because of the limited number of locations for an insertion
as well as the limited character space for insertions. In their study, the minimum possible
password length was 6 characters for the “Insert-2” condition, which appears to be the
most promising for usability and security. They do not report the average lengths of the
passwords collected in their study, but do report the security in terms of bits of their
strengthened passwords. The mean estimated bits of security for the Insert-2 condition
was 67.8 bits, which translates to 2.57x1020 guesses. We also computed the total possible
password space of suggestions possible in their system. Given that the minimum size of
passwords was 6 characters, there are 7 possible locations characters could be inserted.
4.5 Discussion and Future Work 111
Comparison Metric Forget Houshmand PassMod
Security
Vulnerable to GBF 20% 54% 0%
Vulnerable to PCFG (Weir) Unknown 5.48% 5%
Vulnerable to JtR 17.2% 0.10% 3.33%
Vulnerable to Semantic attack Unknown Unknown 0%
Vulnerable to leaked database Unknown 18% 0%
Usability
% reset 0% Unknown 5%
% written down Unknown Unknown 24%
% failed logins (S1) 10% Unknown 15%
Table 4.4 Comparison of security and usability metrics of three different password
strengthening schemes





· (size o f character set) · (guesses to crack initial passwords)
The size of the character set would be 95 to cover all lowercase, uppercase, numbers,
and special characters. The guesses to crack the original passwords would be 40 million
(JtR attack from Forget et al. [21]). The resulting required number of guesses would
be 79.8 billion to run a GBF attack and guess 20% of the improved passwords. This
is a much smaller number of guesses required than seen in PassMod (~1048 guesses
to crack just one). Our system utilizes a blacklist to make the initial password more
difficult to crack. It also can generate an average of ~1048 suggestions per password,
making it more resistant to a guided brute-force attack. See Table 4.4 for a comparison of
the strengthening systems presented by Forget et al. [21], Houshmand et al. [27], and
PassMod. For Forget et al.’s system, the value for GBF attacks was obtained based on
the analysis above. The GBF value for Houshmand et al.’s system was obtained from
Schmidt et al. [47] as they specifically conducted a GBF attack against the strengthened
passwords of Houshmand et al. [27].
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(a) Subject Hidden. (b) Subject Shown.
Fig. 4.12 Design alternative hiding different parts of the password.
4.5.2 Design Alternatives
This section will explain some of the designs we considered as well as the pros and cons
of each.
The first designs we discussed include hiding parts of the user’s password when it is
shown back to them (see Figure 4.12). Figure 4.12a demonstrates hiding the subject of
the password. For example, if the user types the password “ilovedan”, the system would
analyze and determine that “dan” is the subject of the password, and that “ilove” needs
to be changed. When the password is displayed to the user, the subject is starred out to
keep it hidden and secure from shoulder surfing attacks. The user is then informed they
must change everything they see (i.e., what isn’t starred out). This strategy requires the
user to make up and substitute in their own components rather than being “suggested” a
password to use. Figure 4.12b is very similar except the subject is shown and everything
else is hidden.
The next design involves not disclosing any part of the original password to a potential
shoulder surfer. The user starts by typing their original password that needs modification.
As shown in Figure 4.13, when the original password is displayed on the screen, the
entire thing is starred out. Text would appear informing the user of potential structure
modifications suggested by the system. For example, if the user types the password
“ilovedan”, the system could say “Please add a year to the end of your password”, or
“Please insert a city in the middle of your password”. The structure suggestions made by
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the system would be based on a threshold and would make the overall password more
secure.
Fig. 4.13 Design alternative that suggests the user adds components to the original
structure.
The final design decision we reviewed involves the system presenting the user with a
password and asks the user to create a similar (but not the same) one (see Figure 4.14). In
the example presented in Figure 4.14, the password presented to the user is “PurpleDon-
keyNotepad67”. The user is then tasked with coming up with a similar password to use.
The downside of this approach is the entire password structure is presented to the user
(and a potential shoulder surfer). However, the user has the opportuity to be a bit more
creative than in being suggested a password.
Fig. 4.14 Design alternative that presents a password and asks the user to create a similar
one.
User Trust in Web Systems
Through preliminary testing of our system, it appeared as though there may have been
some “doubt” in our system. Mainly, it seemed as though one user was uncomfortable
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inputting their passwords into our system. This sparked an interesting discussion on
user trust in web-based systems. We decided to add two questions to our questionnaire
to further gather user thoughts regarding trust. The first question pertained to whether
participants trust entering their passwords into the system. Overall, 81% of participants
trust the system enough to enter their passwords into it. We were also curious to know
whether participants trusted the passwords being suggested to them were actually secure,
just because the system was claiming them to be. 57% of participants trusted the
passwords suggested to them are secure. This is interesting as the system did not make
passwords less secure in any cases, only more secure.
4.5.3 Multiple Suggestions
Starting as early as our preliminary discussions on the design of the PassMod to pilot
testing and our user study, the notion of presenting multiple suggestions to a user at one
time has been around. As this is the first iteration of this work, we decided that one
suggestion was enough to test the system, how it works, and if it was even feasible to
present memorable suggestions to a user. As the user study was a positive experience, it
is time to start thinking about presenting multiple passwords to participants (see Figure
4.15).
Fig. 4.15 Design alternative that suggests multiple passwords to the user based on the
original structure.
This notion was further solidified when we asked participants in our feedback question-
naire whether or not they would have preferred multiple suggestions. 82% of participants
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agreed they would have preferred to see multiple suggestions so they can select the one
they like the most. There were two participants that commented on the system stating
they wish multiple suggestions were presented to them. We investigated how many
times these participants utilized the “shuffle” button (which randomly generates a new
suggestion). Surprisingly, neither of these participants used the shuffle button once. In
any case, it seems multiple suggestions was a feature the majority of our participants
would have preferred. Furthermore, we found that only 7/28 (25%) of participants opted
to shuffle their password. The average number of shuffles among these participants was
3.3, indicating that providing multiple suggestions of 3 or 4 possibilities would be a good
enhancement.
4.5.4 Alternative Method of Training
Our research stems from Veras et al.’s [59] design of a probabilistic password cracker. As
such, our grammar was generated in a similar way (but using a larger password collection).
This grammar is what is used to assess a password’s strength and furthermore, suggest
modified passwords to a user. It may be interesting to revisit the grammar generation in
the future. For example, since we are suggesting passwords, it made sense to train the
system on a large collection of passwords. This enabled the system to learn the structures
and words that appear in different types of passwords that were created under different
password policies. However, this results in some suggestions that don’t quite make sense
to the user. We have a few checks in place to ensure the suggestions make as much sense
to the user as possible (e.g., limiting suggested words to the top 75,000 most common
unigrams as per COCA). However, it may be beneficial to explore a different type of
grammar, one build on the English language and English structures. This way, the system
could be trained on entire sentences, slang sayings, movie titles, etc. The structures
generated would be much more representative of how people live and speak, and could
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potentially enable the system to make more meaningful suggestions to participants. At
the very least, we expect to see fewer suggestions that do not make any sense because
they were modelled on password language, not English language.
Furthermore, given that PassMod was built using an English language password
grammar, it is only capable of recognizing English language passwords. The strengthening
algorithm is language-independent as it uses data from the grammar. If the grammar
was trained using a password set from a different language, it would allow the system to
correctly recognize passwords from that language.
4.5.5 Memorability of Structures
One of the most interesting aspects of this research to us is what makes a password
memorable? Is it the combination of words? Is it something that is funny, rude, or
serious? Is it something someone made up that makes them think of a vacation, or
significant moment in their life? One potential avenue of future work would be to
determine if there are such things as “memorable structures”. All passwords in our
system are parsed into their segments and a structure is built from the semantic categories.
It would be interesting to see if there exists a structure that is more memorable than
another one. For example, is the structure for “ilovebob” much more memorable than
the structure for “barkingdog5”. Currently, all we have to go off of is the frequency of
structures that appear in our grammar (the number of times each structure was found),
and we assume that a more probable structure is more memorable. It may be that there are
much less probable structures (i.e., more secure) that are just as memorable. If we make
suggestions using these structures, we could potentially increase the memorability of the
passwords that are suggested while also increasing the security. The current version of
PassMod appears to increase security while maintaining memorability.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented PassMod, a system capable of taking a password and
semantically modifying it to make it more secure. We have designed the system with
both memorability and security in mind. Unlike previous password modification systems,
we attempt to preserve the meaning behind the original password and add segments that
enhance or maintain the memorability, rather than hinder it (i.e., semantic modifications).
In this way, we are able to increase the security of the password with no apparent reduction
in memorability.
Through our user study, we have demonstrated that the passwords suggested by
PassMod are memorable, and much more secure than their unmodified counterparts.
Much work still has to be done in this area to enhance the user experience. For example,
multiple suggestions presented at one time was a remark shared by many participants in
our study. Participants were given the option to shuffle, but it seems many just opted to
use the first suggestion, even if it wasn’t one they particularly preferred. Other avenues of
future work include trying to strengthen the memorability of the system even further by
investigating what base structures (if any) are more memorable, and training the system
on English grammar to try and create a more meaningful suggestion.
CHAPTER 5
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
In this Chapter we discuss the differences between GeoPassNotes [40] and PassMod and
compare both to traditional text passwords as seen in Al Omari et al. [4]. The password
policy used by Al Omari et al. enforced a minimum of 8 characters in length containing at
last one special character, number, and uppercase letter. In GeoPassNotes, the credential
is the combination of a user-selected location on a digital map and an annotation for
that location. The annotation can be a memory, significant event, or just a sequence of
words the user can associate with the location. PassMod allows users to authenticate
using a system-modified variant of a password the user provides. The system changes the
password by adding or modifying components to make it more secure. The user must
then authenticate using the newly modified password. This chapter aims at analyzing and
comparing the usability (Section 5.2), memorability (Section 5.3), acceptability (Section
5.4), and security (Section 5.5) of these two approaches with one another and with text
passwords to provide context and recommentdations.
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5.1 Context and Limitations
As this chapter compares the results collected from three different studies, we discuss the
limitations and merits of this comparison in terms of the three different studies that were
conducted.
All three studies used the same study design; the participants were asked to create
their credentials in session 1 (day one), login using their credentials one day later (session
2), and then login one week later (session 3). Participant demographic information
was collected in session 1, and feedback on the studies and authentication scheme was
collected at the end of session 3.
All three studies were conducted on a university campus and used students from
UOIT as study participants. Al Omari et al.’s study also collected results from the general
population and information technology professionals. We only compare the results of
GeoPassNotes and PassMod studies to the students group of Al Omari et al.’s study as
this is the most relevant.
One of the main differences between the three studies is the environment used for
the study. Both PassMod and Al Omari et al.’s password study were fully online studies.
For each session, participants were briefly told what they had to do, and were free to
complete it from wherever they want. In these types of studies, participants may feel more
comfortable and as such, may answer the questionnaires a little more honestly opposed
to being watched in a lab setting. The downside of these studies is participants might
be more distracted than in a lab setting; this may skew the results, especially the login
times. GeoPassNotes was the only study that was conducted in a closed lab environment.
As such, it is possible participants felt coerced into answering the questionnaires more
positively as a member of the research team was observing them. Finally, the questions
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asked in each study had some differences; we compare only where the same question was
asked.
5.2 Usability Comparison
The users from the GeoPassNotes study reported the system was user friendly and “fun”
to use. When asked if they could easily use this method every day, 90% of users either
agreed or strongly agreed (see Table 5.1). This bodes well for this system as its use is
primarily in environments where accounts are logged into infrequently (i.e., once per
week). This compares with PassMod where 47% of users reported being able to easily use
this password every day. We would also like to mention that users might have interpreted
this question as that they need to go through the modification process every time they
login. In their everyday use after creation, the passwords generated by our system are no
different than any other password in terms of their usability. PassMod was created to be
quicker to use than GeoPassNotes, and as such, should be able to be used every day. We
asked users of PassMod if they would use this method for some accounts if they knew
it was more secure than passwords (see Table 5.4). 64% of users agreed to this which
compares with 50% of users in Al Omari et al. [4]. Furthermore, Al Omari et al. found
that 47% of the users in their study preferred an authentication system that was easier to
use than passwords. This bodes well for GeoPassNotes given that users reported it was
very user friendly and easy to use.
We also report on the usability in terms of login times. For GeoPassNotes, the average
login times were 32, 37, and 47 seconds for sessions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These
times are relatively high for an authentication system, which could be in part due to the
fact that it is a new approach and users were still getting used to it. We propose it would
most appropriately be used in environments where logins are infrequent. PassMod on the
5.3 Memorability Comparison 121
Usability Metric GeoPassNotes PassMod
I could easily use this method every day 80% 47%
I could easily use this method every week 90% 41%
I found this method too difficult to use 3% 27%
I found this method too time-consuming 17% 32%
I found this method easier than passwords 20% N/A
Table 5.1 Usability comparison of authentication approaches.
other hand saw much more reasonable times. The average login times were 12, 11, and
12 seconds for sessions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. This is comparable to passwords without
the PassMod system where the average login time for three sessions was 13.7 seconds
[4]. The login time for PassMod is comparable to text passwords, but GeoPassNotes was
~3 times longer; however, user sentiment about the GeoPassNotes system appears to be
more positive.
5.3 Memorability Comparison
We compare and contrast the memorability of GeoPassNotes and PassMod in this section
as with both systems the study design was the exact same (three sessions spread across
8-9 days). The annotated location-passwords produced from GeoPassNotes proved to
be memorable, both in practice and perceived. The majority of users from that study
(66%) believed they would not forget their annotated location-password for another 3
months (see Table 5.3). The memorability of GeoPassNotes was very high, with some
users commenting that the system was “an extremely memorable way to authenticate”. In
total, GeoPassNotes saw 21 failed login attempts over the course of the user study, but no
forgotten annotated location-passwords (see Table 5.2). Al Omari et al. [4] asked users
of their text password study if they would prefer a password that was slower to input
but easier to remember for infrequently logged into accounts; 53% of users agreed. On
the other hand, the passwords modified by PassMod received mixed results in terms of
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Memorability Metric GeoPassNotes PassMod Passwords (strict policy)
% users failed logins 13% 47% N/A
% users password resets 0% 14% 11%
Table 5.2 Failed login comparison of authentication approaches.
Memorability Metric GeoPassNotes PassMod
I found this easier to remember than passwords 43% 0%
I had no trouble remembering my token 93% 55%
I think I could remember my token for one month 93% 59%
I think I could remember my token for three months 90% 41%
I think I could remember my token for six months 66% 27%
I think I could remember my token for one year 37% 23%
I think I would never forget my credential 43% 18%
Table 5.3 Memorability comparison of authentication approaches.
memorability. Users self-perceived memorability was low, with 41% stating they could
remember their password for another 3 months. Throughout the course of the study, 6
users (4 in session 2, 2 in session 3) forgot their passwords and had to reset. This value is
higher than in GeoPassNotes. In conclusion, we have found annotated location-passwords
to be a memorable form of authentication when compared to traditional passwords and
those modified by PassMod.
5.4 Acceptability Comparison
For the GeoPassNotes system, most users (90%) agreed they would use the system for
some of their accounts. When asked if they would use it for most of their accounts,
the majority remained neutral. We deduce this is most likely due to long login times.
Almost all users reported they would use this method if they knew it was more secure
than a password. Surprisingly, PassMod saw lower acceptance among users. 32% of
users reported they would use this method for most accounts and for some accounts.
Furthermore, 41% of users reported they would consider using this method for most
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Acceptability Metric GeoPassNotes PassMod
I would prefer to use this method for most accounts 40% 32%
I would prefer to use this method for some accounts 90% 32%
I would use this method if I knew it was more secure 90% 64%
than passwords
I would not use this method for any accounts 14% 27%
Table 5.4 Acceptability comparison of authentication approaches.
accounts; 55% of users agreed they would use this method. We were also interested to
see if users preferred password creation rules (what they are used to) or the password
modification method used in the user study. 41% of users prefer PassMod while 59%
prefer the password creating rule method. Since few users had failed logins and password
resets, and seem generally favourable of the system in their comments, we attribute the
low reported acceptance due to users infrequently experiencing the nuisance of password
creation rules because of password reuse. If users created separate passwords for every
account that had to conform to each sites password composition policies, the password
creation rules method may not be as plausible of a choice. We also note that this question
is subject to user’s perception of what typical password rules are; many sites apply
different password policies, and Al Omari’s study indicates that when a strict policy is
applied, many users do not like it.
5.5 Security Comparison
In terms of security, we compare the resistance of GeoPassNotes, PassMod, and traditional
passwords against popular password cracking attacks (see Table 5.5). The GeoPassNotes
study was modelled off of the GeoPass system (see Chapter 3). We simulated a password
cracking attack against the notes collected in our study and added their security to the
related location based on which threat model (unknown, known, local) the location fell
under. The results indicate the weakest annotated location-password contains ~37 bits
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% passwords vulnerable to
online attack offline attack
GeoPassNotes 0% 10%
PassMod 0% 4.5%
Passwords (strict policy) N/A 8.3%
Table 5.5 Different authentication schemes vulnerability to offline and online attacks.
of security, which is still enough to withstand an online attack. Florêncio et al. [20]
recommend at least 1021 guesses in order to be considered secure against an offline
attack. As such, the weakest annotated location-passwords would be vulnerable to an
offline attack. We conducted a similar cracking attack against the original passwords
and modified passwords collected throughout the PassMod user study. When trying to
crack the original passwords, the most successful attack came from the semantic cracker,
being able to crack 33.33% of the passwords. Surprisingly, the traditional passwords
collected from Al Omari et al.’s [4] study held up surprisingly well against attacks, with
only 8.3% being cracked using the semantic approach. We assume this is attributable
to the fact that they enforced a password policy stating their password must be >= 8
characters in length, with at least one special character, one number, and one uppercase
character. PassMod did not contain a password policy except that passwords must not
be smaller than 5 characters and they must not be present on a blacklist of the top 3,500
most common passwords. The strengthened passwords created from PassMod were able
to completely thwart the semantic attack, and limited JtR and PCFG to only cracking
3.33% and 5% of the strengthened passwords, respectively.
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5.6 Comparison of Benefits Provided by Authentication
Schemes
Bonneau et al. [10] present an evaluation criteria by which different authentication
schemes can be evaluated. Note that this comparison is intended for web authentication
and as such may not capture all desirable properties and trade-offs for other environments.
Table 5.6 provides a comparison of the Usability (U1 - U8), Deployability (D1 - D6) and
Security (S1 - S11) benefits that each authentication system contains.
Table 5.6 compares and contrasts the benefit that each authentication scheme provides
with each other. It is meant to differentiate each authentication scheme. The rows are
sectioned based on the different authentication schemes discussed. Finally, traditional
text-based web passwords were provided for comparison with the approaches mentioned
in this thesis.
The following sections explain each of these benefits and provide a comparative table
according to Bonneau et al. [10].
5.6.1 Usability Benefits
This section explains the benefits as related to how easy the system is to use.
U1 - Memorywise-effortless
The scheme does not require that users remember anything at all.
U2 - Scalable-for-users
Scalable in terms of the user; multiple accounts does not increase the burden on the user.
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U3 - Nothing-to-carry
Users do no need any extra device or materials to use the system. Quasi nothing-to-carry
is granted if the user must use a device that they typically have on them at all times
(Mobile Device).
U4 - Physically-effortless
No effort is required by the user aside from pressing a button. Quasi physically-effortless
is granted if all the user has to do is speak or gaze at the screen.
U5 - Easy-to-learn
Users can learn how to use the system fairly easily.
U6 - Efficient-to-use
The login time for users is acceptably short.
U7 - Infrequent-errors
Legitimate users are granted access most of the time.
U8 - Easy-recovery-from-loss
User can regain the ability to authenticate if their credentials are lost.
5.6.2 Deployability Benefits
This section explains the benefits related to setting up and using the system in a real
environment.
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D1 - Accessible
Users are not prevented from using the system with a disability.
D2 - Negligible-cost-per-user
Low cost for entire deployment of the system.
D3 - Server-compatible
Providers don’t need to change their existing authentication for it to work with the new
scheme.
D4 - Browser-compatible
The system is expected to be compliant with current internet standards (HTML5 and
Javascript-enabled browser).
D5 - Mature
System has been implemented by multiple parties and has had multiple studies done on it.
D6 - Non-proprietary
Anyone can use the system without having to pay royalties.
5.6.3 Security Benefits
This section explains the security benefits of each system.






























U3 - Nothing-to-carry ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
U4 - Physically-effortless
U5 - Easy-to-learn ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
U6 - Efficient-to-use ■ ■
U7 - Infrequent-errors ■ ■ ■ ■ □ □
U8 - Easy-recovery-from-loss ■ ■
D1 - Accessible ■ ■
D2 - Negligible-cost-per-user ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
D3 - Server-compatible ■ ■
D4 - Browser-compatible ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
D5 - Mature ■ ■
D6 - Non-proprietary ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
S1 - Resilient-to-phyical-observation
S2 - Resilient-to-targeted-impersonation □
S3 - Resilient-to-throttled-guessing ■ ■ □ ■
S4 - Resilient-to-unthrottled-guessing ■ ■
S5 - Resilient-to-internal-observation ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
S6 - Resilient-to-leaks-from-verifiers
S7 - Resilient-to-phishing
S8 - Resilient-to-theft ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
S9 - No-trusted-third-party ■ ■
S10 - Require-explicit-consent ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
S11 - Unlinkable ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Table 5.6 Comparison of different authentication schemes according to Bonneau’s catego-
rization [10].
Legend
■ - contains benefit
□ - partially contains benefit (see Section 5.6 for details on column headers)
No value indicates absence of the benefit
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S1 - Resilient-to-physical-observation
An adversary cannot observe login credentials and use them to authenticate themselves.
S2 - Resilient-to-targeted-impersonation
An adversary cannot login if they have knowledge of the users personal information (birth
date, family, etc.)
S3 - Resilient-to-throttled-guessing
If the number of login attempts is limited by the system, a significant number of illegiti-
mate users would be denied access.
S4 - Resilient-to-unthrottled-guessing
If the number of login attempts is not limited by the system, a significant number of
illegitimate users would still be denied access.
S5 - Resilient-to-internal-observation
An adversary cannot intercept web traffic and capture login credentials.
S6 - Resilient-to-leaks-from-other-verifiers
The authentication server cannot leak anything that could compromise a user’s account.
S7 - Resilient-to-phishing
An adversary cannot collect credentials by impersonating an authentication server.
S8 - Resilient-to-theft
An adversary cannot gain access to the system by stealing an object required for authenti-
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cation.
S9 - No-trusted-third-party
The scheme does not rely on a third parties services.
S10 - Requiring-explicit-consent
The authentication process cannot start without a user specifically consenting to such.
S11 - Unlinkable
Multiple authentication servers cannot determine if the user is authenticating to both.
Based on the results presented, we see that GeoPassNotes allows users to create very
memorable authentication tokens they feel they could remember for extended periods
of time. However, the login times are longer than that of the average account. As such,
GeoPassNotes is best suited in environments where logins are infrequent (i.e., once per
week). The weakest form of GeoPassNotes is when the user directly labels a place that
is local to the system. Even then, the security provided by GeoPassNotes is adequate
to withstand an online attack [20]. PassMod on the other hand experienced much more
reasonable login times when compared to passwords. The modification system was able
to increase the length of passwords from an average of 10 characters to an average of
15 characters. Florêncio et al. state that after 106 and 1021 guesses, the efficacy of an
online and offline attack, respectively, is significantly reduced. As such, we benchmarked
our system at those levels and found that the system was completely resistant to online
guessing attacks when throttling is being used. Given the high security and low login
times, we suggest this system is most appropriate in everyday login situations. We also
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suggest that this system might be used to help users create more unique passwords they
can remember for multiple accounts, reducing password reuse accross multiple accounts.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we explore and evaluate two authentication schemes aimed at increasing
the security of authentication while preserving / increasing memorability of credentials.
We implemented and evaluated a security enhancement for location-passwords called
GeoPassNotes. Through a 30 person user study, we found that annotated location-
passwords remain as memorable as their untagged counterparts, however yield much more
security against attacks when our recommendations are applied. Compared to location-
passwords [56], we found annotations only slightly increase login time. Although tagged
location-passwords are highly memorable, and may have stronger security than text
passwords, it is still only a viable option for accounts where logins are infrequent (e.g.,
to replace the role of text passwords or secondary/fallback authentication in financial
accounts, where logins have been found to average 1.3 times/week [35]). This is because
login times for GeoPassNotes are high (median login time 26-36 seconds) vs. under 10
seconds for traditional passwords. The results of our study also show that users are most
open to using this system once/week.
We also implemented a password strengthening system we call PassMod. PassMod
takes a user’s password and strengthens it by adding components. These components are
typically words, but can also be series of digits or symbols. In a 43 person user study, we
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evaluated the usability and memorability of the passwords produced by PassMod. The
results indicate that, in practice, the usability of the passwords produced from PassMod
are similar to traditional passwords. Login times are comparable (~10-13 seconds) to
passwords, as are password resets. Overall, our system was able to increase the average
character length of passwords from ~10 characters to ~15 characters. Furthermore, we
conducted a password cracking attack using current best methods and found that at most,
5% of the strengthened passwords could be cracked (using PCFG). We propose this
system is best suited for everyday environments where users have one important account
they must remember a password for (e.g., a password manager master password). The
reason is because PassMod can help users create and remember different, more secure
variations of a password they already use. PassMod can help users remember more
secure passwords since they are based on their original ones. This begs the question of
whether passwords generated by the system are too similar to the originals, and the user
could have just “slightly modified” the original. We analyzed the original and modified
passwords collected from our study to see how different the system was making them.
On average, the system needs to make 1.56 modifications to a password to make it secure.
This also raises the average character count from 10 to 15 characters.
Through our research, it has been demonstrated that password security can be im-
proved through the use of systems and strategies that are more compatible with human
memory. With regards to our research questions presented in Chapter 1, we have found
that:
1. Annotating a chosen place on a map can significantly increase the security of
location passwords with very little reduction in memory.
2. Entering a memorable password and having it altered in a sensible way significantly
improves the security of the password while preserving the memorability.
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3. When the results of GeoPassNotes and PassMod are compared to text passwords,
we see that both approaches are capable of generating a secure, memorable token.
Due to login times, GeoPassNotes is most well-suited for environments where
logins are infrequent. PassMod is most suited for everyday environments where a
secure, memorable authentication token is required.
Our research into the memorability of passwords and alternative ways to help users
remember credentials has demonstrated that other viable authentication approaches exist.
GeoPassNotes is an memorable form of authentication. It was shown that it would be
very difficult for an attacker, even if they know some information about the user, to crack
a user’s annotated location-password. GeoPass [56] has undergone more testing than
GeoPassNotes, so a further study appears to be a good next step for the GeoPassNotes
system. A larger field study that gathers usage statistics over a large period of time as
well as interference between multiple GeoPassNotes would be an interesting next step.
PassMod allows users to input their weak passwords and be suggested alternatives that
have been deemed secure against a semantic guessing attack. It could also be used by
users to help them come up with new passwords, before they create their accounts. This
is the first iteration and study of the PassMod system. As such, there are many potential
avenues of future work. Some include design modifications to the interface. Others
include investigating the use of an English grammar opposed to a password grammar.
This could potentially allow the system to make a grammatically correct password a
larger percent of the time.
REFERENCES
[1] Abadi, M., Lomas, T. M. A., and Needham, R. (1997). Strengthening passwords.
Digital System Research Center, Tech. Rep, 33:1–11.
[2] Al-Ameen, M. N. and Wright, M. (2014). A comprehensive study of the geopass
user authentication scheme. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.2852.
[3] Al-Ameen, M. N. and Wright, M. (2015). Multiple-password interference in the
geopass user authentication scheme. In NDSS Workshop on Usable Security.
[4] Al Omari, R. and Thorpe, J. (2016). Password user studies ecological validity. In
Submission.
[5] Albanesius, C. (2012). Yahoo Voices Breach Exposes 453,000 Passwords. http:
//www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2407015,00.asp, site accessed February 2016.
[6] BBC (2014). LinkedIn Passwords Leaked by Hackers. http://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-18338956, site accessed May 2014.
[7] Bicakci, K. and van Oorschot, P. C. (2011). A multi-word password proposal
(gridword) and exploring questions about science in security research and usable
security evaluation. In Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop, pages
25–36.
[8] Biddle, R., Chiasson, S., and Van Oorschot, P. C. (2012). Graphical passwords:
Learning from the first twelve years. ACM Computing Surveys, 44(4):19.
[9] Bird, S., Klein, E., and Loper, E. (2009). Natural Language Processing with Python.
O’Reilly Media, Inc., 1st edition.
[10] Bonneau, J., Herley, C., Van Oorschot, P. C., and Stajano, F. (2012). The quest to
replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication
schemes. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 553–567.
[11] Brown, A. S., Bracken, E., Zoccoli, S., and Douglas, K. (2004). Generating and
remembering passwords. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18(6):641–651.
[12] Cheswick, W. (2013). Rethinking passwords. Communications of the ACM,
56(2):40–44.
References 136
[13] Chiasson, S., Forget, A., Stobert, E., van Oorschot, P. C., and Biddle, R. (2009).
Multiple password interference in text passwords and click-based graphical passwords.
In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security,
pages 500–511.
[14] Davies, M. (1990–2015). Corpus of Contemporary American English. http://corpus.
byu.edu/coca/, site accessed July, 2013.
[15] dazzlepod (2014). Password list. http://dazzlepod.com/site_media/txt/passwords.txt,
site accessed February 2014.
[16] Dunphy, P., Heiner, A. P., and Asokan, N. (2010). A closer look at recognition-based
graphical passwords on mobile devices. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security.
[17] Dunphy, P. and Yan, J. (2007). Do background images improve draw a secret
graphical passwords? In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 36–47.
[18] Egelman, S., Sotirakopoulos, A., Muslukhov, I., Beznosov, K., and Herley, C.
(2013). Does my password go up to eleven?: The impact of password meters on
password selection. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, pages 2379–2388.
[19] Florencio, D. and Herley, C. (2007). A Large-Scale Study of Web Password Habits.
In Proceedings of the International World Wide Web Conference.
[20] Florêncio, D., Herley, C., and Van Oorschot, P. C. (2014). An administrator’s guide
to internet password research. Large Installation System Administration Conference,
pages 44–61.
[21] Forget, A., Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P. C., and Biddle, R. (2008a). Improving text
passwords through persuasion. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security, pages 1–12.
[22] Forget, A., Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P. C., and Biddle, R. (2008b). Persuasion
for stronger passwords: Motivation and pilot study. In Persuasive Technology, pages
140–150. Springer.
[23] Garside, R., L. G. and Sampson, G. (1988). The Computational Analysis of English:
A Corpus-based Approach, volume 57. Longman.
[24] Google (2016). Purchasing the google maps apis premium plan. https://developers.
google.com/maps/premium/faq#purchasing-the-google-maps-apis-premium-plan, site
accessed June, 2016.




[26] Hayashi, E. and Hong, J. (2011). A diary study of password usage in daily life. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
pages 2627–2630.
[27] Houshmand, S. and Aggarwal, S. (2012). Building better passwords using prob-
abilistic techniques. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference, pages 109–118.
[28] Inglesant, P. and Sasse, M. A. (2010). The true cost of unusable password policies:
Password use in the wild. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, pages 383–392.
[29] Jermyn, I., Mayer, A. J., Monrose, F., Reiter, M. K., Rubin, A. D., et al. (1999). The
design and analysis of graphical passwords. In Usenix Security.
[30] Ji, S., Yang, S., Wang, T., Liu, C., Lee, W.-H., and Beyah, R. (2015). Pars: A
uniform and open-source password analysis and research system. In Proceedings of
the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 321–330.
[31] Kelley, P. G., Komanduri, S., Mazurek, M. L., Shay, R., Vidas, T., Bauer, L., Christin,
N., Cranor, L. F., and Lopez, J. (2012). Guess again (and again and again): Measuring
password strength by simulating password-cracking algorithms. In IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, pages 523–537.
[32] Khot, R. A., Srinathan, K., and Kumaraguru, P. (2011). Marasim: A novel jigsaw
based authentication scheme using tagging. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages 2605–2614.
[33] Klein, D. V. (1990). Foiling the cracker: A survey of, and improvements to,
password security. In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Workshop, pages 5–14.
[34] Krebs, B. (2014). Banks: Credit card breach at home depot. http://krebsonsecurity.
com/2014/09/banks-credit-card-breach-at-home-depot/, site accessed February, 2016.
[35] Kristo, G., Janssen, S. M., and Murre, J. M. (2009). Retention of autobiographical
memories: An internet-based diary study. Memory, 17(8):816–829.
[36] Kuhn, B. T. and Garrison, C. (2009). A survey of passwords from 2007 to 2009. In
Information Security Curriculum Development Conference, pages 91–94.
[37] Labs, D. (2010). Brief Analysis of the Gawker Password Dump. https://duo.com/
blog/brief-analysis-of-the-gawker-password-dump, site accessed February 2016.
[38] LastPass (2008). LastPass Password Manager. https://lastpass.com, site accessed
May 2016.
[39] Li, H. and Abe, N. (1998). Generalizing case frames using a thesaurus and the mdl
principle. Computational Linguistics, 24(2):217–244.
[40] MacRae, B., Salehi-Abari, A., and Thorpe, J. (2016). An exploration of geographic
authentication schemes. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
(to appear).
References 138
[41] McCrum, R., Cran, W., and MacNeil, R. (2003). The story of English. Penguin
Group USA.
[42] Moore, G. E. (1965). Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Elec-
tronics, 38(8).
[43] Nelson, D. L., Reed, V. S., and Walling, J. R. (1976). Pictorial superiority effect.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 2(5):523.
[44] Openwall (2002a). John the Ripper Password Cracker. http://www.openwall.com/
john/, site accessed January 2014.
[45] Openwall (2002b). JohnTheRipper. https://github.com/magnumripper/
JohnTheRipper, site accessed January 2014.
[46] Schechter, S., Brush, A. B., and Egelman, S. (2009). It’s no secret. measuring the
security and reliability of authentication via “secret” questions. In IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, pages 375–390.
[47] Schmidt, D. and Jaeger, T. (2013). Pitfalls in the automated strengthening of
passwords. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
pages 129–138.
[48] Schmitt, N. and McCarthy, M. (1997). Vocabulary: Description, acquisition and
pedagogy, volume 2035. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
[49] Security, S. (2014). Leaked Passwords. http://downloads.skullsecurity.org/
passwords/, site accessed May 2014.
[50] Shay, R., Komanduri, S., Kelley, P. G., Leon, P. G., Mazurek, M. L., Bauer, L.,
Christin, N., and Cranor, L. F. (2010). Encountering stronger password requirements:
User attitudes and behaviors. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security.
[51] Social Security Administration (1935). Beyond the Top 1000 Names. http://http:
//www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/limits.html, site accessed September 2013.
[52] Spitzer, J., Singh, C., and Schweitzer, D. (2010). A security class project in graphical
passwords. Journal of Computing Sciences in Colleges, 26(2):7–13.
[53] State of California Department of Justice (2014). Submitted breach notification sam-
ple. http://oag.ca.gov/ecrime/databreach/reports/sb24-47706, site accessed February,
2016.
[54] Stubblefield, A. and Simon, D. (2004). Inkblot authentication.
[55] Sun, H.-M., Chen, Y.-H., Fang, C.-C., and Chang, S.-Y. (2012). Passmap: a
map based graphical password authentication system. In Proceedings of the ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 99–100.
References 139
[56] Thorpe, J., MacRae, B., and Salehi-Abari, A. (2013). Usability and security
evaluation of geopass: a geographic location-password scheme. In Proceedings of the
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security.
[57] Tripadvisor (2000). Kaufer, Stephen and Steinert, Langley . http://www.tripadvisor.
com, site accessed March, 2014.
[58] van Oorschot, P. C. and Thorpe, J. (2011). Exploiting predictability in click-based
graphical passwords. Journal of Computer Security, 19(4):669–702.
[59] Veras, R., Collins, C., and Thorpe, J. (2014). On semantic patterns of passwords and
their security impact. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium.
[60] Veras, R., Thorpe, J., and Collins, C. (2012). Visualizing Semantics in Passwords :
The Role of Dates. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Visualization
for Cyber Security, pages 88–95.
[61] Weidenbeck, S., Waters, J., Birget, J.-C., Brodskiy, A., and Memon, N. (2005).
Authentication using graphical passwords: Basic results. Proc. Human-Computer
Interaction International.
[62] Weir, M., Aggarwal, S., Collins, M., and Stern, H. (2010). Testing metrics for pass-
word creation policies by attacking large sets of revealed passwords. In Proceedings of
the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 162–175.
[63] Weir, M., Aggarwal, S., De Medeiros, B., and Glodek, B. (2009). Password
cracking using probabilistic context-free grammars. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 391–405.
[64] Wiedenbeck, S., Waters, J., Birget, J.-C., Brodskiy, A., and Memon, N. (2005).
Authentication using graphical passwords: Effects of tolerance and image choice. In
Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, pages 1–12.
[65] Wright, N., Patrick, A. S., and Biddle, R. (2012). Do you see your password?:
Applying recognition to textual passwords. In Proceedings of the Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security.
[66] Yadron, D. (2014). Man behind the first computer password:
It’s become a nightmare. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/21/
the-man-behind-the-first-computer-password-its-become-a-nightmare, site ac-
cessed May 2016.
[67] Zhang, Y., Monrose, F., and Reiter, M. (2010). The security of modern password
expiration: An algorithmic framework and empirical analysis. In Proceedings of the
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
